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Abstract
Distributed negotiation schemes offer one approach to agreeing an allocation of resources among a set of individual agents.
Such schemes attempt to agree a distribution via a sequence of locally agreed ‘deals’ – reallocations of resources among the agents
– ending when the result satisfies some accepted criteria. Our aim in this article is to demonstrate that some natural decision
questions arising in such settings can be computationally significantly harder than questions related to optimal clearing strategies
in combinatorial auctions. In particular we prove that the problem of deciding whether it is possible to progress from a given initial
allocation to some desired final allocation via a sequence of “rational” steps is PSPACE-complete.
c© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The abstraction wherein a triple 〈A,R,U〉 represents sets of agents, resources, and “utility” functions by which
individual agents associate values with resource subsets, has proven to be a useful mechanism in which to consider
problems concerning how best to distribute a finite collection of items among a group of agents. In very informal
terms, two general approaches have been the basis of algorithmic studies concerning how to organise the allocation
of resources to agents. Centralised mechanisms of which combinatorial auction techniques are possibly the best-
known exemplar. In addition, distributed methods deriving from the contract-net model formulated by Smith [19]
whose properties are the subject of the present article. In Combinatorial Auction schemes, e.g. [15,16,20,21,11,
12], a centralised controlling agent (the “auctioneer”) assumes responsibility for determining which agents receive
which resources, basing its decisions on the bids submitted by individual agents. Bidding protocols vary in expressive
complexity from those that simply allow an agent to submit a single bid of the form 〈S, p〉 expressing the fact that
the agent is prepared to pay some price p in return for the subset S of R. More complex methods allow a number
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of different subsets to be described in separate bids, e.g. the so-called XOR language discussed in [15]. A typical aim
of the auctioneer is to decide which bids to accept so as to maximise the overall price paid subject to at most one
agent being granted any resource. This scheme gives rise to the Winner Determination Problem of deciding which
bids among those submitted are successful. In its most general form Winner Determination is NP-hard, but there are a
number of powerful heuristic approaches and winner determination can be efficiently carried out albeit if the bidding
language is of very limited expressiveness. Despite the practical effectiveness of these approaches, there has, however,
been a recent revival of interest in autonomous distributed negotiation schemes building on the pioneering study of
these by Sandholm [13]. It is not difficult to identify motivations underpinning this renewed interest. For example,
the implementation overheads in schema where significant numbers of bids (possibly having complex structures) are
communicated to a single controlling agent; the potential difficulties that might arise in persuading an individual
agent to assume the roˆle and responsibilities of auctioneer and the need to ensure that bidding agents comply with
the decisions made by the auctioneer. There are, in addition, the issues raised in deciding on a bidding protocol given
the extremes from languages that are highly expressive to those which have very rigid and simple structures. The
former are typically computationally hard for winner determination. The latter, while tractable, face the problem of no
allocation at all being compatible with the bids received. Finally, aside from the computational problems with which
the auctioneer is faced, there is the highly non-trivial issue for the agents bidding as regards selecting and pricing
resource sets so as to optimise the likelihood of their “most preferred” bid being accepted.
Faced with such computational issues, notwithstanding the advances in combinatorial auction technology,
environments whereby allocations are settled following a process of local improvements negotiated by agents agreeing
changes, appear attractive. This is particularly so when the protocols for proposing and implementing resource
transfers between agents limit the number of possibilities that individual agents may have to review.
The principal results of this paper establish that, far from resulting in a computationally more tractable regime or,
indeed, even one that exhibits complexity “no worse” than the NP-hard status of winner determination, a number of
natural decision questions concerning simple distributed negotiation protocols, have significantly greater complexity.
In particular, we show that given a description of a resource allocation setting – 〈A,R,U〉 – together with some initial
and desired allocations 〈P(s), P(t)〉 deciding if the desired allocation can be realised by a sequence of rational “local”
reallocations is PSPACE-complete. Thus, deciding if a particular type of negotiation will be effective in bringing
about a reallocation is at a similar level of complexity to classical AI planning problems, e.g. as considered in
the work of Bylander [1]. We, further, note one of our results resolves a question left open from Dunne et al. [6]:
specifically we show the problem, of deciding if there is a rational sequence of “one-resource-at-a-time” reallocations
to progress between given starting and final allocations, to be PSPACE-complete, improving upon the earlier NP-
hardness classification.
In the next section we introduce the formal structures of contract-net derived distributed negotiation reviewing
the components of this presented by [13] together with the terminology and notation that will be used subsequently.
Section 3 describes the decision questions that are considered, summarises related work concerning these, and presents
a formal statement of the results subsequently proved in Section 5. Separating these two sections, we give a high-level,
informal overview of the proof mechanisms in Section 4.
The problems analysed in Section 5 are concerned with what might be called “local” properties of a given
allocation setting, specifically whether it is possible to progress from a given starting point to a desired allocation
via a restricted class of negotiation primitives. In Section 6 we address “global” properties of such schemes which
we term Convergence and Accessibility. The convergence problem, also studied in work of [7,2], considers a property
of resource allocation settings using only a restricted class of deals. Namely, is the setting such that no matter what
starting allocation is used and whichever sequence of allowed deals is followed, an optimal allocation will always
be reached? Perhaps surprisingly, for the restricted deal classes under which the questions considered in Section 5
turn out to be PSPACE-complete, deciding convergence properties is “only” coNP-complete. Accessibility, considers
whether from a given starting point there is at least one sequence of permitted deals that reaches an optimal outcome.
This, too, turns out to be PSPACE-complete. We present concluding comments and discuss further developments in
Section 7.
2. Resource allocation settings and local negotiation
The principal structure we consider in this paper is presented in the following definition.
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Definition 1. A resource allocation setting is defined by a triple 〈A,R,U〉 where
A = {A1, A2, . . . , An}; R = {r1, r2, . . . , rm}
are, respectively, a set of (at least two) agents and a collection of (non-shareable) resources. A utility function, u, is a
mapping from subsets of R to rational values. Each agent Ai ∈ A has associated with it a particular utility function
ui , so that U is 〈u1, u2, . . . , un〉. An allocation P of R to A is a partition 〈P1, P2, . . . , Pn〉 of R. The value ui (Pi ) is
called the utility of the resources assigned to Ai . We use Πn,m to denote the set of all partitions of m resources among
n agents: it is easy to see that |Πn,m | = nm , there being n different choices for the owner of each of the m resources.
Given some starting allocation, P ∈ Πn,m , individual agents may wish to “improve” this: for the purposes of
this paper, the concept of an allocation Q improving upon an allocation P will be defined in purely quantitative
terms. Even within these limits there are, of course, many different methods by which an allocation P may be
quantitatively rated. For the settings considered in this paper we concentrate on the measure utilitarian social welfare,
denoted σu(P), which is simply the sum of the agents’ utility functions for their allocated resources under P , i.e.
σu(P) =∑ni=1 ui (Pi ).
We next formalise the concepts of deal and contract path.
Definition 2. Let 〈A,R,U〉 be a resource allocation setting. A deal is a pair 〈P, Q〉 where P = 〈P1, . . . , Pn〉 and
Q = 〈Q1, . . . , Qn〉 are distinct partitions of R. The effect of implementing the deal 〈P, Q〉 is that the allocation of
resources specified by P is replaced with that specified by Q. For a deal δ = 〈P, Q〉, we useAδ to indicate the subset
of A involved, i.e. Ak ∈ Aδ if and only if Pk 6= Qk .
Let δ = 〈P, Q〉 be a deal. A contract path for δ is a sequence of allocations
∆ = 〈P(0); P(1); . . . ; P(d−1); P(d)〉
in which P = P(0) and P(d) = Q. The length of ∆, denoted |∆| is d, i.e. the number of deals in ∆.
Sandholm [13] presents a number of restrictions on the form that deals may take, one motivation for such being to limit
the number of deals that a single agent may have to consider. The class of restricted deals presented in the following
definition includes those analysed in [13,14].
Definition 3. Let δ = 〈P, Q〉 be a deal involving a reallocation ofR among A.
a. δ is bilateral if |Aδ| = 2.
b. δ is t-bounded if δ is bilateral and the number of resources whose ownership changes after implementing δ is at
most t .
c. δ is a t-swap if δ is bilateral and for some s ≤ t , Q is formed by exactly s resources in Pi being assigned to A j
and replaced, in turn, by exactly s resources of Pj .
The class of t-bounded and t-swap deals are simple extensions of the classes of O-contracts and S-contracts in [13]:
O-contracts being 1-bounded deals and, similarly, S-contracts are 1-swap deals. We note that t-swap deals are a
special case of (2t)-bounded deals.
We introduce the concept of a deal being rational in the following definition. It will be useful to consider two
forms: one linked to the particular quantitative measure of utilitarian social welfare; and, more generally, one which
is expressed in terms of arbitrary quantitative measures.
Definition 4. A deal 〈P, Q〉 is individually rational (IR) if and only if σu(Q) > σu(P).
The deal 〈P, Q〉 is said to cooperatively rational if for every i , ui (Qi ) ≥ ui (Pi ) and there is at least one j for
which u j (Q j ) > u j (Pj ).
For 〈A,R〉 as before, an evaluation measure is a (total) mapping σ : Πn,m → Q. A deal 〈P, Q〉 is σ -rational if
and only if σ(Q) > σ(P).
We note that δ is individually rational if and only if δ is σu-rational. Where there is no ambiguity we will simply refer
to a deal being rational without specifying σ .
Almost all of our development is in terms of individually rational deals. As we argue in Section 7, our results are
easily modified to hold in the case of cooperatively rational deals.
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It should be noted that the terms “individually rational” and “cooperatively rational” predate the current article,
e.g. Sandholm [13], Endriss et al. [8,9]. The definition of “individually rational” is sometimes presented in terms of
the existence of so-called payment functions with particular properties, e.g. [9, Defn. 13, p. 323]. Informally, such
a function specifies an amount, p(i) that ai ∈ Aδ pays (p(i) > 0) or receives (−p(i) when p(i) < 0) if the
deal is implemented. Thus, δ = 〈P, Q〉 is defined to be individually rational (in terms of payments), if there is a
payment function for which
∑
ai∈Aδ p(i) = 0 and for each ai ∈ Aδ , ui (Qi ) − ui (Pi ) > p(i). With this sense of
individually rational should an agent fail to increase its utility – ui (Qi ) ≤ ui (Pi ) – there would still be an incentive
for it to participate: the payment, −p(i), received would compensate. Similarly when ai increases its utility, although
a positive payment will have to be contributed, this will be sufficiently small to leave ai with some profit. The utility
gained, i.e. ui (Qi )−ui (Pi ) exceeds p(i) the payment made. Although this definition of individually rational (in terms
of payments) superficially appears rather different from that in Definition 4, it is well-known and easily shown that
the two are equivalent. A deal 〈P, Q〉 is individually rational (in terms of payments) if and only if σu(Q) > σu(P)
(the form used in Definition 4), see e.g. [9, Lemma 1, p. 324].
The notions of rationality introduced above are now extended in order to introduce the structures that form the
main object of study in this paper: σ -rational paths.
Definition 5. For 〈A,R〉 and an evaluation measure, σ , a sequence of allocations
∆ = 〈P(0); P(1); . . . ; P(d)〉
is a σ -rational contract path for the (σ -rational) deal 〈P(0), P(d)〉 if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d, 〈P(i−1), P(i)〉 is σ -rational.
More generally, if Φ : Πn,m × Πn,m → {>,⊥}, is some predicate on deals, we say that ∆ is a Φ-path if
Φ(P(i−1), P(i)) holds for each 1 ≤ i ≤ d . We say that Φ-deals are complete for σ -rationality if
∀〈P, Q〉 ∈ Πn,m ×Πn,m : (〈P, Q〉 is σ -rational)⇒ (∃ ∆ : ∆ is a Φ-path for 〈P, Q〉).
3. Decision problems in localised negotiation
The ideas introduced in Definitions 3 and 4 combine to focus on deals that not only restrict their structure (in the
sense of limiting the number of agents and the number of resources involved) but also add the further condition that
a deal must result in a better allocation. It is as a result of such rationality conditions that significant difficulties arise
within local negotiation approaches.
Notice that Definition 5 imposes a monotonicity condition on the sequence of allocations within, for example, 1-
bounded σ -rational paths 〈P(0); . . . ; P(d)〉: not only must 〈P(i), P(i+1)〉 be realisable by moving exactly one resource,
but also σ(P(i+1)) > σ(P(i)). Given that an agent is seeking to maximise its utility, why might such a monotonicity
constraint be important? In other words, why would an agent be unprepared to accept a “short-term” loss when this
will, eventually, be ameliorated? The detailed discussion of this question from [6, pp. 28–30] may be summarised
as follows: the insistence on monotonically increasing σ(P(i)) allows cautious agents to participate in negotiation.
That is to say, without this constraint, an agent may reject a proposed deal under which it suffers a loss1 (even though
subsequent deals will change this) because it is uncertain whether any future proposal will make good its loss, or even
be made at all.2
The effects of combining structural and rationality conditions are already apparent in the following result from
[13].
Fact 6.
a. 1-bounded deals are complete for σ -rationality.
b. IR 1-bounded deals are not complete for individual rationality.
c. If |A| ≥ 3, then IR bilateral deals are not complete for individual rationality.
1 That is, the agent’s utility decreases and (in terms of payment functions) it is offered inadequate compensation.
2 In [6] so-called “chain-letters” are given as an example where such uncertainty is reasonable. Significant gains would be obtained if the chain
continued long enough: owing to doubts that such a profitable outcome will result, individuals may decline to incur the “short-term” loss needed to
propagate the chain.
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Fact 6 motivates a number of natural questions:
Q1. Are there “reasonable” conditions that can be imposed on collections of utility functions, U , so that in settings
〈A,R,U〉 where these hold, IR 1-bounded deals are complete for individual rationality?
Q2. Given 〈〈A,R,U〉, P(s), P(t)〉 with 〈P(s), P(t)〉 being IR, how efficiently can one determine whether there is a
rational 1-bounded contract path for 〈P(s), P(t)〉?
Q3. When such a path does exist what can be proven regarding its properties, e.g. number of deals involved, etc.?
The first has been considered in [7,2] and while these offer some positive results, the initial analyses regarding the
other two questions presented in [4,6] are rather less encouraging.
Fact 7.
a. Given 〈〈A,R,U〉, P(s), P(t)〉 with 〈P(s), P(t)〉 being IR, the problem of deciding if there is a rational 1-bounded
contract path for 〈P(s), P(t)〉 is NP-hard. (Dunne et al. [6, Thm. 12])
b. For every m = |R| ≥ 7 there are choices of 〈〈A,R,U〉, P(s), P(t)〉 for which: there is a unique IR 1-bounded
contract path, ∆, for the IR deal 〈P(s), P(t)〉 and |∆| = Ω(2m). (Dunne [4, Thm. 3].)
c. For every m = |R| ≥ 6 there are choices of 〈〈A,R,U〉, P(s), P(t)〉 with |A| = 3 and for which: there is a unique
IR bilateral contract path, ∆, for the IR deal 〈P(s), P(t)〉 and |∆| = Ω(2m/3). (Dunne [4, Thm. 6].)
Slightly weaker exponential lower bounds for contract path length than those given in Fact 7(b) and (c), continue to
hold even if each agent’s utility function must be monotone, i.e. satisfy for all subsets S and T of R the condition
S ⊆ T ⇒ u(S) ≤ u(T ).
Although the analysis leading to the proof of Fact 7(a) is couched in terms of IR 1-bounded deals, it is
straightforward to adapt it to establish NP-hardness for IR 1-swap deals. The principal contribution of the present
article is in obtaining tight complexity classifications for these decision problems: Theorem 14 proving both to be
PSPACE-complete.
We consider two general forms of decision problems in Section 5 where Φ in the description below is a predicate
on deals.
Φ-PATHE
Instance: 〈〈A,R〉, σ, P(s), P(t)〉 with σ(P(t)) > σ(P(s)).
Question: Is there a Φ-path ∆ for the deal 〈P(s), P(t)〉?
Φ-PATHU
Instance: 〈〈A,R,U〉, P(s), P(t)〉 with σu(P(t)) > σu(P(s)).
Question: Is there a Φ-path ∆ for the deal 〈P(s), P(t)〉?
Although, superficially, these are similar problems, the significant distinction that should be noted is thatΦ-PATHU
is a restricted special case of Φ-PATHE. We elaborate further on the differences in our overview of Section 4.
The particular instantiations of Φ that we consider are the following.
(1) ΦE1-bd,σ -R(P, Q): the predicate which holds if and only if 〈P, Q〉 is a σ -rational 1-bounded deal. We
subsequently denote the resulting specialisation of Φ-PATHE by 1-PATH.
(2) ΦU1-sw,IR(P, Q): the predicate which holds if and only if 〈P, Q〉 is an IR 1-swap deal. We use 1-SWAP to denote
the corresponding special case of Φ-PATHU .
(3) ΦU1-bd,IR(P, Q): the predicate which holds if and only if 〈P, Q〉 is an IR 1-bounded deal. Following the form
used in [6] (in which an NP-hardness lower bound was obtained), we denote this special case of Φ-PATHU by
IRO-PATH.
Of the three decision problems considered, those defined by IRO-PATH and 1-SWAP have been considered in a number
of practical settings. Thus, Sandholm [14] considers so-called “hill-climbing” heuristics built on 1-bounded contracts
to identify optimal task allocations.3 In Dunne et al. [5] t-bounded deals are used in modelling task allocation where
the context is that of assigning sets of locations to be covered by individual agents in solving transportation problems.
We will show that each of the resulting decision problems is PSPACE-complete.
3 The problem of allocating a collection of tasks between a group of cooperating agents with the intention of minimising the overall workload
can, clearly, be treated in a similar manner to that of distributing resources.
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4. Overview of proof methods
This section has three aims: firstly, to address the technical question of how instances of the decision problems
introduced at the conclusion of Section 3 are encoded; secondly, to elaborate on the differences between the forms
Φ-PATHE and Φ-PATHU ; and, finally, to outline the organisation and structure of the proofs presented in Section 5.
4.1. Representing instances
In order to describe instances of Φ-PATHE or Φ-PATHU the problem of encoding functions whose domain is
exponentially large in |R|, i.e. σ : Πn,m → Q; ui : 2R → Q must be addressed. Of course, one approach would be
simply to enumerate values using some ordering of the relevant domain. There are, however, at least two objections
that can be made to such solutions: since the domains are exponentially large – nm and 2m – exhaustive enumeration
would in practical terms be infeasible even in the case of very simple functions, e.g. u(S) = 1 if |S| is even; u(S) = 2
otherwise. The second objection is that exhaustive enumeration schemes are liable to give misleading assessments of
run-time complexity: an algorithm that is polynomial-time in the length of such an encoding, is actually of exponential
complexity in terms of the numbers of agents and resources.
In [6] the following desiderata are proposed for encoding a utility function, u, as a sequence of bits ρ(u):
a. ρ(u) is ‘concise’ in the sense that the length, e.g. number of bits, used by ρ(u) to describe the utility function u
within an instance is “comparable” with the time taken by an optimal program that computes the value of u(S).
b. ρ(u) is ‘verifiable’, i.e. given some binary word, w, there is an efficient algorithm that can check whether w
corresponds to ρ(u) for some u.
c. ρ(u) is ‘effective’, i.e. given S ⊆ R, the value u(S) can be efficiently computed from the description ρ(u).
It is, in fact, possible to identify a representation form that satisfies all three of these criteria: we represent each
member of U in a manner that does not require explicit enumeration of each subset ofR and allows (a) to be met; uses a
‘program’ form whose syntactic correctness can be efficiently verified, hence satisfying (b); and for which termination
in time linear in the program length is guaranteed, so meeting the condition set by (c). The class of programs
employed are the so-called straight-line programs (SLP) which have a natural correspondence with combinational
logic networks [3].
Definition 8. An (m, s)-combinational network C is a directed acylic graph in which there are m input nodes,
Zm , labelled 〈z1, z2, . . . , zm〉 all of which have in-degree 0. In addition, C has s output nodes, called the result
vector. These are labelled 〈ts−1, ts−2, . . . , t0〉, and have out-degree 0. Every other node of C has in-degree at most
2 and out-degree at least 1. Each non-input node (gate) is associated with a Boolean operation of at most two
arguments.4 We use |C | to denote the number of gate nodes in C . Any Boolean instantiation of the input nodes
to a = 〈a1, a2, . . . , am〉 ∈ 〈0, 1〉m naturally induces a Boolean value, h(a) at each node h of C . If h is an input node
associated with zi then h(a) = ai ; if h is associated with the operation ¬ and has as its single input a node g, i.e.
〈g, h〉 is an edge of C , then h(a) = ¬g(a). Finally if h is a gate associated with the operation θ whose inputs are
nodes g1 and g2 (that is, 〈g1, h〉, 〈g2, h〉 are edges of C) then the value h(a) is g1(a)θg2(a). Hence a induces some
s-tuple 〈ts−1(a), . . . , t0(a)〉 ∈ 〈0, 1〉s at the result vector. For the (m, s)-combinational network C and a ∈ 〈0, 1〉m ,
this s-tuple is denoted by C(a).
Although often considered as a model of parallel computation, (m, s)-combinational networks yield a simple form of
sequential program – straight-line programs – as follows. Let C be an (m, s)-combinational network to be transformed
to a straight-line program, SLP(C), that will contain exactly m + |C | lines. Since C is directed and acyclic it may be
topologically sorted, i.e. each gate, g, given a unique integer label τ(g)with 1 ≤ τ(g) ≤ |C | so that if 〈g, h〉 is an edge
of C then τ(g) < τ(h). The line li of SLP(C) evaluates the input zi if 1 ≤ i ≤ m and the gate for which τ(g) = i −m
if i > m. The gate labelling means that when g with inputs g1 and g2 is evaluated at lm+τ(g) since gi is either an input
node or another gate its value will have been determined at l j with j < m + τ(g).
4 In practice, we can restrict the Boolean operations employed to those of binary conjunction (∧), binary disjunction (∨) and unary negation (¬).
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Definition 9. LetR be as previously with |R| = m, and u a mapping from subsets ofR to whole numbers, i.e. a utility
function. The (m, s)-network Cu is said to realise the utility function u if: for every S ⊆ R with s the instantiation of
Zm given by zi = 1 if and only if ri ∈ S, it holds
u(S) = val(C(s))
where for b = 〈bs−1, bs−2, . . . , b0〉 ∈ 〈0, 1〉s , val(b) is the whole number whose s-bit binary expansion is b, i.e.
val(b) =∑s−1i=0 bi ∗ 2i , where bi is treated as the appropriate integer value from {0, 1}.
Definition 9 provides a method of encoding utility functions u : 2R → N ∪ {0} in instances of Φ-PATHU :
each ui ∈ U is represented by a straight-line program, SLP(Cui ) derived from a suitable combinational network. For
instances of Φ-PATHE, the function σ : Πn,m → N ∪ {0} can be encoded in a similar fashion. For example, via a
(mn, s + 1)-combinational network, C , whose input zi, j indicates if r j ∈ Pi ; val(C(α)) is again an s-bit value: the
additional output bit being used to flag if the instantiation α is not a valid partition, e.g. if zi, j = 1 and zk, j = 1 for
some r j and i 6= k.5
A key property of encodings via SLPs is the following result of [10,18].
Fact 10. If f : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}s is computable by a deterministic Turing Machine program in time T , then f may
be realised by an SLP containing O(T log T ) lines.
It should be noted that the proof of Fact 10 is constructive, i.e. the translation is not merely an existence argument
and, in addition, a suitable SLP can be built in time polynomial in T . Thus a further consequence is our subsequent
reductions do not need to give explicit detailed constructions of SLPs.6 It will suffice to specify σ or U for it to be
apparent that these may be computed efficiently: Fact 10 then ensures suitable representations can be formed.
4.2. Distinctions between Φ-PATHE and Φ-PATHU
We recall thatΦ-PATHE concerns the existence of σ -rationalΦ-paths with the evaluation measure, σ , forming part
of the instance whereas Φ-PATHU focuses on the particular choice σ = σu with the collection of utility functions
forming part of the instance. Given that our primary interest is in the measure σu , it may seem that there is some
redundancy in considering Φ-PATHE, e.g. if we introduce utility functions for which u2 = u3 = · · · un = 0,
defining u1(S) as σ(〈S, P2, P3, . . . , Pn〉), where Pi is the particular subset of R held by Ai in a specific case of A1
holding S, then one has σu(P) (in the “new” setting) equal to σ(P) (in the original form). The main objection to
such an approach is that the utility function, u1, is likely to have allocative externalities, i.e. its value is dependent
not only on the actual resources held by A1 but also upon how the other resources are distributed. It has tended to be
the normal assumption, often not even mentioned directly,7 that utility functions do not have such externalities, e.g.
[4,6,8,13]. While the complexity classification of Φ-PATHE has some interest in itself, our main concern is with the
decision problem relating to Φ-PATHU , which focuses on a single measure of how good an allocation is – σu – and,
in keeping with standard approaches, assumes utility functions to be free from externalities.
One point of some importance in our proofs concerning the variant of Φ-PATHE given in Section 5, is that
the evaluation measure, σ , constructed in the instance 〈A,R, σ, P(s), P(t)〉 does not admit a direct translation to
〈A,R,U, P(s), P(t)〉 in which U is externality-free and is such that σu(P) = σ(P). We introduce a “coding trick”
by means of which a general translation from any 〈A,R, σ 〉 to a setting 〈{A1, A2},R′, {u1, u2}〉 results. In particular
this translation provides the means by which two special cases of Φ-PATHU can be proven PSPACE-hard, i.e. the
problems 1-SWAP and IRO-path.
Of course, in principle, our proofs that the special cases of Φ-PATHU are PSPACE-hard could be presented directly,
i.e. without reference toΦ-PATHE and the coding device used. There are, however, a number of reasons why we avoid
such an approach. The first of these is the technical complexity of the proofs themselves: although the translation
5 Although we describe the range of σ and u to be whole numbers using SLP encodings, it is a trivial matter to extend to integers, e.g. use
an additional output bit to indicate whether a value is positive or negative; and to rationals, e.g. treat one section of the output bits as defining a
numerator, the remaining section as a denominator.
6 Some illustrative constructions of SLPs in specific polynomial-time reductions are presented in [6, pp. 33–4].
7 One of the few exceptions is [21] which explicitly states that the valuation functions considered are assumed to be free of allocative externalities.
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from Φ-PATHE to Φ-PATHU turns out to be relatively straightforward; the central result that 1-PATH is PSPACE-
hard on which our subsequent classifications build, is rather more involved. We note that notwithstanding the use of
arbitrary evaluation measures, the problem 1-PATH is a “natural” decision question whose properties, we contend,
merit consideration in their own right.
4.3. Proof structure
We begin by recalling the decision problems considered.
1-PATH (special case of Φ-PATHE)
Instance: 〈A,R, σ, P(s), P(t)〉 with σ(P(t)) > σ(P(s)).
Question: Is there a σ -rational 1-bounded path for 〈P(s), P(t)〉?
1-SWAP (special case of Φ-PATHU )
Instance: 〈A,R,U, P(s), P(t)〉 with σu(P(t)) > σu(P(s)).
Question: Is there an IR 1-swap path for 〈P(s), P(t)〉?
IRO-PATH (special case of Φ-PATHU )
Instance: 〈A,R,U, P(s), P(t)〉 with σu(P(t)) > σu(P(s)).
Question: Is there an IR 1-bounded path for 〈P(s), P(t)〉?
Subject to Φ(P, Q) being decidable in PSPACE it is straightforward to show that Φ-PATHE ∈ PSPACE. For each of
the problems listed, the corresponding Φ(P, Q) is decidable in (deterministic) polynomial-time.
On first inspection the approach taken to proving PSPACE-hardness may seen rather indirect: an “auxiliary problem”
– Achievable Circuit Sequence (ACS) – is defined independently of the arena of multiagent negotiation contexts. The
assertion “1-PATH is PSPACE-complete”, is justified by showing “ACS is PSPACE-complete” (Theorem 12) and then
ACS ≤p 1-PATH (Theorem 13). This auxiliary problem has, however, two important properties. Firstly, it is “easy” to
prove that ACS is PSPACE-complete using standard generic reduction techniques.8 The second property of ACS is that
its formal structure is very similar to that of 1-PATH.
Thus, ACS is concerned with deciding a property of a given (N , N )-combinational logic network, C , with respect
to two distinct binary N -tuples. The N inputs of C are interpreted as a sequence of n data bits 〈x1, x2, . . . , xn〉 coupled
with a sequence of m value bits 〈y0, y1, . . . , ym−1〉; the N outputs are viewed in a similar fashion. Now, suppose that
a = 〈data(a), value(a)〉 and b = 〈data(b), value(b)〉 are the binary N -tuples given with C to form an instance of
ACS.
Recall that val(y) is the whole number represented by the m value bits of C , i.e. val(y) = ∑m−1i=0 (2i ) ∗ yi , and
define
〈datak(a), valuek(a)〉 =
{〈data(a), value(a)〉 if k = 0
C(〈datak−1(a), valuek−1(a)〉) if k > 0.
Since the output of any (N , N )-combinational logic network on a given instantiation of its inputs is uniquely
determined, the sequence [〈datak(a), valuek(a)〉]k≥0 is well-defined and unique.
Informally, ACS asks of its instance 〈C, a, b〉 if there is some value t ≥ 1 with which:
a. 〈datat (a), valuet (a)〉 = 〈data(b), value(b)〉
b. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ t , val(valuei (a)) > val(valuei−1(a)).
Although the formal technical argument that ACS ≤p 1-PATH given in Section 5.2 involves a number of notational
complexities, its basic strategy is not difficult to describe. Recalling that an instance of ACS consists of an
(n+m, n+m)-combinational logic network, C , together with instantiations 〈x, y〉, 〈z, w〉 from 〈0, 1〉n+m , the instance
〈AC ,RC , σ, P(s), P(t)〉 of 1-PATH that is formed uses 5 agents. The resource set RC contains disjoint sets each of
8 That is to say, “easy” pace the notational overheads inherent in most generic simulations of resource-bounded Turing machine classes: the
elegant casting of Turing machine behaviour in terms of planning operators presented in [1] being a notable exception.
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size 2(n+m) –RV andRW – with “appropriate” subsets ofRX (for X ∈ {V,W }) mapping to elements of 〈0, 1〉n+m .
In the initial allocation, P(s), A1 holds the subset ofRV and the subset ofRW that maps to 〈x, y〉 ∈ 〈0, 1〉n+m . In the
final allocation, P(t), A1 should hold the subsets of RV and RW that map to 〈z, w〉. For the agents A2 and A3: the
former should hold subsets ofRV while the latter holds subsets ofRW . The evaluation measure, σ , is constructed so
that any allocation, Q, for which Q2 6⊆ RV or Q3 6⊆ RW has σ(Q) < 0.
The main idea is to simulate the witnessing sequence {〈x i , yi 〉}0≤i≤t for a positive instance of ACS by a sequence
of allocations to A1, i.e. from the initial allocation to A1 which we recall mapped to 〈x0, y0〉 ∈ 〈0, 1〉n+m subsequent
allocations to A1 will be those subsets of RV and RW which map to 〈x i , yi 〉 ∈ 〈0, 1〉n+m . The problem that arises
in this simulation is that if Q(i) is the allocation in which A1’s holding reflects 〈x i , yi 〉 then the deal 〈Q(i), Q(i+1)〉
although σ -rational for the evaluation measure constructed, will not be 1-bounded. In order to effect this deal, a
sequence of 1-bounded σ -rational deals is used which involve the following stages:
1. a subset ofRV is transferred one resource at a time from A2 to A4;
2. a subset ofRV is transferred one resource at a time from A1 to A2;
3. the resources moved into A4 in stage (1) are transferred to A1.
The subset of RV held by A1 on completion will map to 〈x i+1, yi+1〉, while the subset of RW continues to map to
〈x i , yi 〉. These three stages are then repeated, but now with resources fromRW and the agent A3 involved, so that the
subset ofRW held by A1 will, on completion, map to 〈x i+1, yi+1〉.
In order to track whether resources should be moved out of A4 into A1, a “marker” resource, µ, initially held by
A5 is used: µ is reallocated to A4 at the end of the second phase and returned to A5 once the third stage is complete.
The notational overhead in the proof stems from specifying the evaluation measure, σ , in such a way that a σ -
rational 1-bounded sequence of deals to go from P(s) to P(t) is possible if and only if the source instance of ACS
should be accepted.
5. PSPACE-complete negotiation questions
We begin with the relatively straightforward proof that the decision problems we consider are all decidable by
PSPACE algorithms. Since all of these are specialisations of Φ-PATHE and the predicate Φ(P, Q) is polynomial-time
decidable for each, it suffices to prove,
Theorem 11. For predicates Φ : Πn,m × Πn,m → {>,⊥} such that Φ(P, Q) is polynomial-time decidable,
Φ-PATHE ∈ PSPACE.
Proof. Given an instance 〈A,R, σ, P(s), P(t)〉 of Φ-PATHE in which σ : Πn,m → Q is described in the form of a
straight-line program, use a non-deterministic algorithm which proceeds as follows:
P := P(s)
loop
Non-deterministically choose an allocation Q ∈ Πn,m
if ¬Φ(P, Q) then reject
else if Q = P(t) then accept
else P := Q
end loop
If a Φ-path realising 〈P(s), P(t)〉 exists then this non-deterministic algorithm has a computation that will successfully
identify it. The algorithm need only record the allocations P and Q occurring in the loop body and thus can be
implemented in NPSPACE. The theorem now follows from Savitch’s Theorem: NPSPACE = PSPACE, [17]. 
5.1. The achievable circuit sequence problem (ACS)
The following decision problem is central to our subsequent argument.
Achievable Circuit Sequence (ACS)
Instance: (N , N )-combinational logic network, C , with N = n + m inputs 〈Xn, Ym〉 and n + m outputs, 〈Zn,Wm〉;
〈x, y〉, 〈z, w〉 ∈ 〈0, 1〉n+m .
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Question: Is there a sequence
Γ = 〈〈x0, y0〉, 〈x1, y1〉, . . . , 〈xk, yk〉〉
such that
a. 〈x0, y0〉 = 〈x, y〉,
b. 〈xk, yk〉 = 〈z, w〉,
c. ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k, C(x i−1, yi−1) = 〈x i , yi 〉 and val(yi ) > val(yi−1)?
Theorem 12. ACS is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. An instance 〈C, x, y, z, w〉 of ACS can be decided by a (deterministic) polynomial-space computation that
iterates evaluating
〈x i+1, yi+1〉 = C(x i , yi )
(starting with 〈x, y〉).
This computation terminates either when val(y
i+1) ≤ val(yi ) (the instance is rejected) or when 〈z, w〉 occurs
with the former condition taking precedence when 〈x i+1, yi+1〉 = 〈z, w〉. Since there are only 2n+m possible cases,
eventually one of these two termination conditions must arise. The whole computation can be accomplished in
polynomial-space since only the current 〈x i , yi 〉 need be remembered.
For PSPACE-hardness we use a generic reduction, i.e. given a Turing machine program, M , input s, and space-
bound S = |s|c we form an instance of ACS that is accepted if and only if s is accepted by M within an S-space
bounded computation. We may assume that M has a unique accepting configuration u. It suffices to note that from the
description of M we can build a (t, t)-combinational logic network CM whose input bits encode configurations of M
on exactly S tape-cells. For such a configuration, χ , CM (χ) = pi if and only if the configuration pi follows in exactly
one move of M from the configuration χ . Note we may use the convention that CM (u) = u for the unique accepting
configuration. Combine CM with a p-bit counter, D, i.e. val(D(v)) = val(v)+ 1 with p chosen large enough so that
the total number of configurations of S-tape bounded configurations of M can be represented in p bits.9 Now let s be
the instantiation of the inputs of CM corresponding to the initial configuration of M on input s: s is accepted by M if
and only if 〈(CM , D), 〈s, 0p〉, 〈u, 1p〉〉 is accepted as an instance of ACS. 
5.2. ACS is polynomially-reducible to 1-PATH
It will be convenient to introduce the following notation and definitions.
For V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn+m} and W = {w1, w2, . . . , wn+m} disjoint sets of n + m propositional variables, we
define sets
RV = {v1, v2 , . . . , vn+m, ¬v1 , . . . , ¬vn+m}
RW = {w1, w2 , . . . , wn+m, ¬w1 , . . . , ¬wn+m}
R = RV ∪ RW .
In our subsequent notation, in order to avoid repetition, X refers to either of V or W .
Given S ⊆ R, the subset SX is defined via SX = S ∩RX . We define a partial mapping, β : 2R → 〈0, 1〉n+m as
follows.
For all of the cases below, β(S) is undefined, i.e. β(S) = ⊥ whenever
SV 6= ∅ and SW 6= ∅
or
S ⊆ RX and |S| 6= n + m
or
S ⊆ RX and there is some i for which {xi ,¬xi } ⊂ S.
9 It is easy to show that p = O(S).
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For the remaining cases,
β(S) = 〈a1a2 . . . an+m〉 where ai =
{
0 if ¬xi ∈ S
1 if xi ∈ S.
Given a = 〈a1a2 . . . an+m〉 ∈ 〈0, 1〉n+m , there is a uniquely defined set S ⊆ RX for which β(S) = a. Thus we can
introduce β−1X as a total mapping from 〈0, 1〉n+m to subsets fromRX , as
β−1X (a) = S ⊆ RX such that β(S) = a.
For a ∈ 〈0, 1〉n+m , we denote by valm(a) the whole number whose m bit binary representation is an+1an+2 · · · an+m ,
i.e the value
∑n+m
i=n+1 (ai ) ∗ 2n+m−i .
Let S and T be subsets ofRX that satisfy all the conditions (CS1)–(CS4).
CS1. S ∩ T = ∅
CS2. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n + m) either xi 6∈ S or ¬xi 6∈ S
CS3. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n + m) either xi 6∈ T or ¬xi 6∈ T
CS4. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n + m) if (xi 6∈ S) and (¬xi 6∈ S) then (xi ∈ T ) or (¬xi ∈ T ).
For such sets S, T the composite set, S ⊗ T , is the subset ofRX given by
S ⊗ T = S \ ({x : ¬x ∈ T } ∪ {¬x : x ∈ T })
⋃
T .
Now suppose that C is an (N , N )-combinational logic network with N = n+m, a ∈ 〈0, 1〉n+m , and S ⊆ RX , is such
that for each i , either xi 6∈ S or ¬xi 6∈ S. The difference set for S with respect to a is the subset ofRX ,
DIFFX (S, a) = β−1X (a) \ S.
The following lemma establishes some useful relationships between the composite set operation, ⊗, and difference
sets.
Lemma 1. Let C be an (n+m, n+m)-combinational logic network, a ∈ 〈0, 1〉n+m , and, as in the notation introduced
above, letRX denote {x1, . . . , xn+m,¬x1, . . . ,¬xn+m}.
For every D ⊆ β−1X (a) \ β−1X (C(a)), the sets S and T defined by
S = β−1X (a) ∩ β−1X (C(a)) ∪ D
T = DIFFX (S,C(a))
have the following properties,
a. T = β−1X (C(a)) \ β−1X (a)
b. S ⊗ T = β−1X (C(a)).
Proof. For (a), from the definition of DIFFX ,
T = DIFFX (S,C(a))
= β−1X (C(a)) \ (β−1X (a) ∩ β−1X (C(a)) ∪ D)
= β−1X (C(a)) \ β−1X (a).
The final line following as D ⊆ β−1X (a) \ β−1X (C(a)) and thus D ∩ β−1X (C(a)) = ∅.
For (b), consider the set S ⊗ T . This is formed by first removing from S all elements in
F = {x ∈ S : ¬x ∈ T }
⋃
{¬x ∈ S : x ∈ T }.
We claim that this set comprises exactly those elements of the set D. To see this, first observe that F cannot contain
any member of the set β−1X (a) ∩ β−1X (C(a)): if x ∈ β−1X (a) ∩ β−1X (C(a)) then x ∈ β−1X (C(a)) and from the fact
that T ⊆ β−1X (C(a)) this precludes ¬x ∈ T . Without loss of generality, suppose for the sake of contradiction, that
x ∈ D\F – a similar argument applies if we assume instead ¬x ∈ D\F . From the fact that D ⊆ β−1X (a)\β−1X (C(a))
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we have x ∈ β−1X (a) and x 6∈ β−1X (C(a)). Since exactly one of x and ¬x must appear in β−1X (C(a)) we deduce that
¬x ∈ β−1X (C(a)). We now have
x ∈ D ⊆ β−1X (a) \ β−1X (C(a)) ⊆ S
and
¬x ∈ β−1X (C(a)) \ β−1X (a) = T
and thus x ∈ F contradicting our assumption that x ∈ D \ F . It follows, therefore, that D ⊆ F and thus, recalling
that F ∩ β−1X (a) ∩ β−1X (C(a)) = ∅,
S \ F = (β−1X (a) ∩ β−1X (C(a)) ∪ D) \ F
= β−1X (a) ∩ β−1X (C(a)).
Having formed S \ F , the construction of S ⊗ T is completed by adding all elements in T , so that
S ⊗ T = (S \ F) ∪ T
= β−1X (a) ∩ β−1X (C(a)) ∪ β−1X (C(a)) \ β−1X (a)
= β−1X (C(a))
as was claimed. 
We now prove,
Theorem 13. 1-PATH is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. Noting that 1-PATH ∈ PSPACE the result will follow via Theorem 12 by showing ACS≤p1-PATH.
Thus given, 〈C, 〈x, y〉, 〈z, w〉〉 an instance of ACS we form 〈AC ,RC , σ, P(s), P(t)〉 for which
〈C, 〈x, y〉, 〈z, w〉〉 ∈ LACS ⇔ 〈AC ,RC , σ, P(s), P(t)〉 ∈ L1-PATH.
AC contains five agents,
AC = {A1, A2, A3, A4, A5}.






Here µ is a “new” resource distinct from those inRV ∪RW .
For the source and destination allocations – P(s) and P(t) – we use,
P(s)1 = β−1V (〈x, y〉) ∪ β−1W (〈x, y〉)
P(s)2 = RV \ P(s)1
P(s)3 = RW \ P(s)1
P(s)4 = ∅
P(s)5 = {µ}
P(t)1 = β−1V (〈z, w〉) ∪ β−1W (〈z, w〉)
P(t)2 = RV \ P(t)1
P(t)3 = RW \ P(t)1
P(t)4 = ∅
P(t)5 = {µ}.
To complete the construction, we need to specify σ .
Given Q ∈ Π5,4(n+m)+1, we will have σ(Q) ≥ 0 only if Q satisfies all of the following requirements:
B1. Q1 ⊆ RV ∪RW .
B2. Q2 ⊆ RV .
B3. Q3 ⊆ RW .
B4. QV4 = ∅ or QW4 = ∅.
B5. Q5 ⊆ {µ}, i.e. either Q5 = ∅ or Q5 = {µ}.
B6. For X ∈ {V,W }, if QXi 6= ∅ then for all j , {x j ,¬x j } 6⊆ QXi .
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Assuming that (B1) through (B6) hold, then σ(Q) ≥ 0 if and only if (at least) one of the following six conditions
holds true10 of Q.
C1. β(QV1 ) = β(QW1 ) and Q4 ⊆ DIFFV (QV1 ,C(β(QW1 ))).
C2. β(QV1 ⊗ QV4 ) = C(β(QW1 )) and Q4 = DIFFV (QV1 ,C(β(QW1 ))).
C3. β(QV1 ∪ QV4 ) = C(β(QW1 )) and µ ∈ Q4.
C4. β(QV1 ) = C(β(QW1 )) and Q4 ⊆ DIFFW (QW1 , β(QV1 )).
C5. β(QV1 ) = β(QW1 ⊗ QW4 ) and Q4 = DIFFW (QW1 , β(QV1 )).
C6. β(QV1 ) = β(QW1 ∪ QW4 ) and µ ∈ Q4.
One further requirement relating to (C3) is the following. Let f and g be the instantiations in 〈0, 1〉n+m defined as
f = β(PW1 )
g = C(β(PW1 ))
then, in addition valm(g) > valm( f ).11
We write, C1(Q), C2(Q), etc. if Q satisfies C1, C2, and so on.
In the specification of σ given below, Kmn ∈ N is a suitably large integer value depending on n + m.12
For an allocation Q satisfying at least one13 of these conditions, σ(Q) is
C1 2 Kmnvalm(β(QW1 )) +|Q4|
C2 2 Kmnvalm(β(QW1 )) +|Q4| +n + m − |QV1 |
C3 Kmnvalm(β(QW1 ))+ Kmnvalm(C(β(QW1 ))) −|Q4|
C4 2 Kmnvalm(β(QV1 )) +|Q4| − 2 −3|DIFFW (QW1 , β(QV1 ))|
C5 2 Kmnvalm(β(QV1 )) −2|Q4| − 2 +n + m − |QW1 |
C6 2 Kmnvalm(β(QV1 )) −|Q4|.
For any allocation, Q, in which none of these conditions holds, we set σ(Q) = −1.
We note, at this juncture, that σ(Q) can be evaluated in time polynomial in the number of bits required to encode the
instance of ACS: firstly, given C , the relationship between QV1 , Q
W
1 and Q4 characterising each of the six conditions
is easily checked, and the evaluation of σ(Q), given that one of these is satisfied, involves basic arithmetic operations,
e.g. multiplication and addition, on values represented in O(m) bits. It follows, via Fact 10, that an appropriate SLP
defining σ can be efficiently constructed.
We claim that 〈C, x, y, z, w〉 is accepted as an instance of ACS if and only if 〈AC ,RC , σ, P(s), P(t)〉 is accepted
as an instance of 1-PATH.
Suppose that 〈C, x, y, z, w〉 ∈ LACS and let
Γ = 〈x0, y0〉 , . . . , 〈x i , yi 〉 , . . . , 〈x p, y p〉
be the sequence of instantiations in 〈0, 1〉n+m witnessing this. Consider the sequence of allocations
〈Q(0), Q(1) , . . . , Q(p)〉
10 To avoid excessive repetition, when, for S ⊆ RV ∪RW , we refer to β(S) in specifying any of these six conditions, it should be taken that
β(S) 6= ⊥: should this fail to be the case then the condition in question is not satisfied.
11 By imposing this condition, which is not strictly necessary for the subsequent argument, we can simplify the analysis of one particular case in
proving the correctness of the reduction.
12 Choosing Kmn = 3(m + n) + 2 suffices for σ to have the properties needed in the subsequent proof and since this value is represented in
O(logmn)-bits the polynomial-time computability of the reduction from ACS is unaffected.
13 Although, it is possible for Q to satisfy both of C1 and C2 or both of C4 and C5 in the cases where this arises the value that results for σ(Q)
applying C1 (resp. C4) is the same as the value that results using C2 (resp. C5).
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in which
Q(i)1 = β−1V (〈x i , yi 〉) ∪ β−1W (〈x i , yi 〉)
Q(i)2 = RV \ Q(i)1
Q(i)3 = RW \ Q(i)1
Q(i)4 = ∅
Q(i)5 = {µ}.
For each of these, C1(Q(i)) holds: when Q = Q(i) we have
β(QV1 ) = β(QW1 ) = 〈x i , yi 〉
Q4 = ∅ ⊆ DIFFV (QV1 ,C(β(QW1 ))).
In addition,
σ(Q(i)) = 2Kmnvalm(〈x i , yi 〉) = 2Kmnval(yi )
< 2Kmnval(yi+1) = 2Kmnvalm(〈x i+1, yi+1〉)
= σ(Q(i+1)).
So that the sequence of allocations 〈Q(0), Q(1) , . . . , Q(p)〉 is σ -rational. This sequence, however, is not 1-bounded,
and so to complete the argument that positive instances of ACS yield positive instances of 1-PATH with the reduction
described, we need to construct a 1-bounded, σ -rational sequence for each of the deals 〈Q(i), Q(i+1)〉.
Consider any Q(i) for some 0 ≤ i < p and the following sequences of 1-bounded deals starting with Q(i).




1 ))) from A2 to A4, giving the allocation S
(i),1.
Let T ( j) be the allocation resulting after exactly j resources have been moved from A2 to A4, so that
T (0) = Q(i) and T (d) = S(i),1, (with d = |DIFFV (Q(i),V1 ,C(β(Q(i),W1 )))|).
Since the resources held by A1 are unchanged by the deal 〈T ( j−1), T ( j)〉 it follows that each of the allocations
T ( j) satisfies C1. In addition, T (d) also satisfies C2. Each of these deals is σ -rational, since for 0 ≤ j ≤ d:
σ(T ( j)) = σ(T (0))+ j . We observe that using C2 to evaluate T (d) returns,
σ(T (d)) = σ(T (0))+ d + (n + m)− |Q(i),V1 | = σ(T (0))+ d
since, from the fact that C1 holds, β(Q(i),V1 ) 6= ⊥ and this requires |Q(i),V1 | = n + m.
S2. Using 1-bounded deals, transfer the set
D = {v ∈ S(i),1,V1 : ¬v ∈ S(i),14 }
⋃
{¬v ∈ S(i),1,V1 : v ∈ S(i),14 }
from A1 to A2, to give the allocation S(i),2.
Again denote by T ( j) the allocation resulting after exactly j resources have been moved from A1 to A2, with
T (0) = S(i),1, T (d) = S(i),2 and d = |D|. Notice that
d = |S(i),14 | = |DIFFV (β−1V (〈x i , yi 〉),C(〈x i , yi 〉))|.
Each of these allocations satisfies C2. To see this, first observe that the resources held by A4 are unchanged by
any of the deals 〈T ( j−1), T ( j)〉: throughout this stage A4 holds
β−1V (C(〈x i , yi 〉)) \ β−1V (〈x i , yi 〉).
The subset of RV held by A1, initially β−1V (〈x i , yi 〉), is altered by transferring D to A2. This set of resources,
however, is exactly β−1V (〈x i , yi 〉)\β−1V (C(〈x i , yi 〉)), so that from Lemma 1(a), in the allocation T ( j), the subsets
ofRV held by A1 and A4 have the respective forms,
G = β−1V (〈x i , yi 〉) ∩ β−1V (C(〈x i , yi 〉)) ∪ D j
H = DIFFV (G,C(〈x i , yi 〉)).
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Applying Lemma 1(b), β(G⊗H) = C(〈x i , yi 〉), i.e. each of the allocations T ( j) satisfies the conditions specified
in C2. Finally we have
σ(T ( j)) = σ(T (0))+ n + m − (n + m − j) = σ(T (0))+ j
so that each of the deals 〈T ( j−1), T ( j)〉 is σ -rational.
It should be noted that, in S(i),2 we have
|S(i),2,V1 | = n + m − |S(i),24 | = n + m − |β−1V (C(〈x i , yi 〉)) \ β−1V (〈x i , yi 〉)|
so that,
σ(S(i),2) = 2Kmnval(yi )+ 2|β−1V (C(〈x i , yi 〉)) \ β−1V (〈x i , yi 〉)|.
S3. Transfer the resource µ from A5 to A4 to give the allocation S(i),3.
The allocation satisfies S(i),3 satisfies C3, and has
S(i),3,W1 = β−1W (〈x i , yi 〉).
Furthermore,
|S(i),34 | = 1+ |β−1V (C(〈x i , yi 〉)) \ β−1V (〈x i , yi 〉)|.
With the evaluation measure σ
σ(S(i),2) = 2Kmnval(yi )+ 2|β−1V (C(〈x i , yi 〉)) \ β−1V (〈x i , yi 〉)|
< Kmnval(yi )+ Kmnval(yi+1)− |β−1V (C(〈x i , yi 〉)) \ β−1V (〈x i , yi 〉)| − 1
= σ(S(i),3).
The deal 〈S(i),2, S(i),3〉 is σ -rational since with val(y
i+1) ≥ val(yi )+ 1 and Kmn large enough,
σ(S(i),3)− σ(S(i),2) ≥ Kmn − 3|β−1V (〈x i+1, yi+1〉) \ β−1V (〈x i , yi 〉)| − 1≥ Kmn − 3(n + m)− 1
> 0.
S4. Using 1-bounded deals, transfer the set S(i),3,V4 from A4 to A1, giving S
(i),4.
Let T ( j) be the allocation resulting after exactly j resources have been moved from A4 to A1, with
T (0) = S(i),3 and T (d) = S(i),4 with
d = |S(i),3,V4 | − 1 = |β−1V (〈x i+1, yi+1〉) \ β−1V (〈x i , yi 〉)|.
Noting that
S(i),3,V1 = β−1V (〈x i+1, yi+1〉) ∩ β−1V (〈x i , yi 〉)
S(i),3,V4 = β−1V (〈x i+1, yi+1〉) \ β−1V (〈x i , yi 〉)
we see that each of the allocations, T ( j) satisfies C3: β(T ( j),V1 ∪ T ( j),V4 ) = C(β(T ( j),W1 )). In addition
σ(T ( j)) = σ(T (0))+ j
so each deal 〈T ( j−1), T ( j)〉 is σ -rational. For the allocation, S(i),4 we have
σ(S(i),4) = Kmnval(yi )+ Kmnval(yi+1)− 1.
S5. Transfer the resource µ from A4 to A5 giving S(i),5.
The allocation S(i),5 satisfies C4:
S(i),54 = ∅ ⊆ DIFFW (S(i),5,W1 , 〈x i+1, yi+1〉)
β(S(i),5,V1 ) = 〈x i+1, yi+1〉 = C(β(S
(i),5,W
1 )).
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The deal 〈S(i),4, S(i),5〉 is σ -rational since
σ(S(i),4) = Kmnval(yi )+ Kmnval(yi+1)− 1
σ(S(i),5) = 2Kmnval(yi+1)− 2− 3|DIFFW (S
(i),5,W
1 , 〈x i+1, yi+1〉)|
so that, since val(y
i+1) ≥ val(yi )+ 1,
σ(S(i),5)− σ(S(i),4) ≥ Kmn − 1− 3(n + m) > 0.




1 )) from A3 to A4, to give the allocation S
(i),6.
Let T ( j) be the allocation in place after exactly j resources have been transferred from A3 to A4, so that
T (0) = S(i),5 and T (d) = S(i),6 with
d = |DIFFW (S(i),5,W1 , β(S(i),5,V1 ))|.
By similar arguments to those used when considering S1 above, we see that each of the allocations T ( j) satisfies
C4. The allocation T (d) in addition satisfies C5. The deal 〈T ( j−1), T ( j)〉 is σ -rational since,
σ(T ( j)) = σ(T (0))+ |T ( j)4 | = σ(T (0))+ j.
We, further note, that σ(T (d)) when evaluated by using C4 is,
2Kmnval(yi+1)− 2− 2|DIFFW (S
(i),5,W
1 , 〈x i+1, yi+1〉)|
(since |T (d)4 | = |DIFFW (S(i),5,W1 , 〈x i+1, yi+1〉)|), and if evaluated using C5,
σ(T (d)) = 2Kmnval(yi+1)− 2− 2|DIFFW (S
(i),5,W
1 , 〈x i+1, yi+1〉)| + n + m − |T
(d),W
1 )
= 2Kmnval(yi+1)− 2− 2|DIFFW (S
(i),5,W
1 , 〈x i+1, yi+1〉)|.
S7. Using 1-bounded deals, transfer the set
D = {w ∈ S(i),6,W1 : ¬w ∈ S(i),64 }
⋃
{¬w ∈ S(i),6,W1 : w ∈ S(i),64 }
from A1 to A3 to give S(i),7.
Let T ( j) denote the allocation after exactly j resources have been transferred from A1 to A3, so that
T (0) = S(i),6 and T (d) = S(i),7 with d = |D|. By a similar argument to that in S2,
d = |S(i),64 | = |DIFFW (β−1W (〈x i , yi 〉), 〈x i+1, yi+1〉)|.
Again via Lemma 1 and the analysis of S2 it follows that each allocation T ( j) satisfies C5. The deal
〈T ( j−1), T ( j)〉 is σ -rational by virtue of the fact that σ(T ( j)) = σ(T (0))+ j , so that
σ(S(i),7) = 2Kmnval(yi+1)− 2− 2|DIFFW (β−1W (〈x i , yi 〉), 〈x i+1, yi+1〉)| + n + m − |S
(i),7,W
1 |
= 2Kmnval(yi+1)− 2− |DIFFW (β−1W (〈x i , yi 〉), 〈x i+1, yi+1〉)|.
The last line following from the fact that
S(i),7,W1 = β−1W (〈x i , yi 〉) ∩ β−1W (〈x i+1, yi+1〉).
S8. Transfer µ from A5 to A4 to give S(i),8.
The allocation S(i),8 satisfies C6 with the deal 〈S(i),7, S(i),8〉 being σ -rational:
σ(S(i),8) = 2Kmnval(yi+1)− 1− |S(i),74 |
> 2Kmnval(yi+1)− 2− |S(i),74 |= σ(S(i),7).
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S9. Using 1-bounded deals, transfer the set S(i),8,W4 from A4 to A1, giving S
(i),9.
Letting T ( j) be the allocation after exactly j resources have been moved so that T (0) = S(i),8 and
T (d) = S(i),9 with d = |S(i),8,W4 |, each T ( j) satisfies C6 and the deal 〈T ( j−1), T ( j)〉 is σ -rational since
σ(T ( j)) = σ(T (0))+ j . The allocation S(i),9 has S(i),94 = {µ} so that, σ(S(i),9) = 2Kmnval(yi+1)− 1.
Furthermore, S(i),9 has
β(S(i),9,V1 ) = β(S(i),9,W1 ) = 〈x i+1, yi+1〉.
S10. Transfer the resource µ from A4 to A5 giving S(i),10. This allocation satisfies C1 and, since σ(S(i),10) =
2Kmnval(yi+1) the deal 〈S(i),9, S(i),10〉 is σ -rational.
To complete the argument that positive instances of ACS induce positive instances of 1-PATH in the reduction
described, it suffices to note that the allocation S(i),10 is exactly that described by Q(i+1).
It remains only to prove that should 〈AC ,RC , σ, P(s), P(t)〉 describe a positive instance of 1-PATH then the instance
〈C, 〈x, y〉, 〈z, w〉〉 from which it arose described a positive instance of ACS.
Thus, let
Γ = 〈Q(0); Q(1); · · · ; Q(i); · · · ; Q(p)〉
be a sequence of allocations for which
a. Q(0) = P(s)
b. Q(p) = P(t)
c. ∀1 ≤ i ≤ p 〈Q(i−1), Q(i)〉 is 1-bounded and σ -rational.
Given an allocation Q ∈ Π5,4(n+m)+1 we say that Q has the assignment property if
(C1(Q) holds and Q4 = ∅) OR (C3(Q) holds and Q4 = {µ}).
Consider the sub-sequence of Γ ,
∆ = 〈S(0); S(1); · · · ; S(d)〉
such that every S( j) in ∆ has the assignment property and if 〈S( j), S( j+1)〉 correspond to allocations 〈Q(i), Q(i+k)〉
in Γ then for every 1 ≤ t < k, the allocation Q(i+t) does not have the assignment property. Noting that P(s) and
P(t) both have the assignment property, it is certainly the case that ∆ can be formed and will have S(0) = P(s)
and S(d) = P(t). Our aim is to use ∆ to extract the witnessing sequence of instantiations from 〈0, 1〉n+m certifying
〈C, 〈x, y〉, 〈z, w〉〉 as a positive instance of ACS.
From ∆ we may define a sequence of pairs – 〈ai , bi 〉 ∈ 〈0, 1〉n+m × 〈0, 1〉n+m – via ai = β(S(i),V1 ) and
bi = β(S(i),W1 ). Since any allocation, Q, with the assignment property must satisfy either C1 or C3 it follows that
β(QV1 ) and β(Q
W
1 ) are both well-defined: if C1(Q) this is immediate from the specification of C1; if C3(Q) then
since Q4 must contain only the element µ it follows that QV4 = ∅ and, again, that β(QV1 ) is well-defined follows from
the defining conditions for C3.
In order to extract the appropriate witnessing sequence for 〈C, 〈x, y〉, 〈z, w〉〉 ∈ LACS it suffices to show that
〈ai , bi 〉 behaves as follows:
〈ai , bi 〉 =

〈〈x, y〉, 〈x, y〉〉 if i = 0
〈C(ai−1), bi−1〉 if i > 0 and i is odd〈ai−1,C(bi−1)〉 if i > 0 and i is even.
For the sequence {〈ai , bi 〉 : 0 ≤ i ≤ d} defined from Γ = 〈S(0); · · · S(d)〉 consider the sequence of 1-bounded,
σ -rational deals that realise the (σ -rational) deal 〈S(0), S(1)〉.
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First observe that this must comprise three sequences — 〈S(0), T (1)〉, 〈T (1), T (2)〉, and 〈T (2), T (3)〉 of 1-bounded,
σ -rational deals implementing
〈S(0), T (1)〉 with C1(T (1)), C2(T (1)), and T (1)4 = DIFFV (S(0),V1 ,C(b0))
〈T (1), T (2)〉 with C3(T (2)) and |T (2),V1 | = n + m − |T (2)4 |
〈T (2), S(1)〉 with C3(S(1)) and S(1),V4 = ∅.
To see this14 consider the allocations, P , such that 〈S(0), P〉 is 1-bounded and σ -rational. Given that P must satisfy
at least one of the conditions (C1) through (C6), and that C1(S(0)) holds, we must have P1 = S(0)1 , P3 = S(0)3
and P5 = S(0)5 , i.e. 〈S(0), P〉 involves transferring some resource held by A2 to A4. Any such resource, however,
must belong to the set DIFFV (S
(0),V
1 ,C(b0)) or C1(P) will fail to hold. By similar arguments any 1-bounded, σ -
rational continuation of P will eventually reach the allocation T (1). In the same way, considering any allocation P for
which 〈T (1), P〉 is 1-bounded and σ -rational, it follows that T (1)3 = P3, T (1)4 = P4 and T (1)5 = P5 so that 〈T (1), P〉
transfers some resource between A1 and A2: the only choices for such transfers which preserve condition C2 are those
v ∈ T (1),V1 for which ¬v ∈ T (1)4 or ¬v ∈ T (1),V1 for which v ∈ T (1)4 . Eventually such transfers lead to the allocation
T (2) described and, in the same way from T (2) to the allocation S(1).
From C1(T (1)) and C2(T (1)) we have
β(T (1),V1 ) = a0 = b0 = β(T (1),W1 ).
From C3(T (2)) we have
β(T (2),V1 ∪ T (2),V4 ) = C(b0) = C(a0).
So that, in total, from C3(S(1)) and S(1),V4 = ∅ we obtain
a1 = C(a0) ; b1 = b0
as required.
In the same way, noting that 〈C(a0), b0〉 6= 〈〈z, w〉, 〈z, w〉〉, it cannot be the case that S(1) = S(d). Thus, by similar
arguments to those given above, we may identify further sequences – 〈S(1), T (3)〉, 〈T (3), T (4)〉 and 〈T (4), S(2)〉 – of
σ -rational, 1-bounded deals that realise 〈S(1), S(2)〉. These have the form
〈S(1), T (3)〉 with C4(T (3)), C5(T (3)), and T (3)4 = DIFFW (S(1),W1 , a1)
〈T (3), T (4)〉 with C6(T (4)) and |T (4),W1 | = n + m − |T (4)4 |
〈T (4), S(2)〉 with C1(S(2)) and S(1)4 = ∅.
From C4(T (3)) and C5(T (3)) we have
β(T (3),V1 ) = a1 = C(a0)
β(T (3),W1 ) = b1 = b0.
From C6(T (4)) we obtain,
β(T (4),W1 ∪ T (4),W4 ) = β(T (4),V1 ) = a1.
Finally, C1(S(2)) and S(2)4 = ∅ give
a2 = β(S(2),V1 ) = a1
b2 = β(S(2),W1 ) = a1 = C(b1) = C(b0).
Thus, a2 = a1 and b2 = C(b1).
14 For ease of presentation we give only a brief outline of the argument here. The (somewhat tedious) fuller expansion of individual cases is
provided in Appendix.
P.E. Dunne, Y. Chevaleyre / Theoretical Computer Science 396 (2008) 113–144 131
Thus the assertion regarding {〈ai , bi 〉}0≤i≤d follows by an identical analysis of the cases
〈a2, b2〉 , . . . , 〈a2 j , b2 j 〉 , . . . .
We now easily obtain the witnessing sequence that 〈C, 〈x, y〉, 〈z, w〉〉 is a positive instance of ACS simply by using,
〈a0, a2 , . . . , a2 j , . . . , a2k〉
where d = 2k. We have already seen that this satisfies
a0 = 〈x, y〉
a2k = 〈z, w〉∀1 ≤ i ≤ k a2i = C(a2(i−1)).
This sequence, however, must also satisfy valm(a2i ) > valm(a2(i−1)): the deal 〈S(2(i−1)), S(2i)〉 is σ -rational as it
is realised during the 1-bounded, σ -rational implementation of 〈P(s), P(t)〉. From the definition of σ , recalling that
C1(S(2i)) and S(2i)4 = ∅ we have
σ(S(2(i−1))) = 2Kmnvalm(β(S(2(i−1)),W1 ))
= 2Kmnvalm(β(S(2(i−1)),V1 ))= 2Kmnvalm(a2(i−1))
σ (S(2i)) = 2Kmnvalm(β(S(2i),W1 ))
= 2Kmnvalm(β(S(2i),V1 ))= 2Kmnvalm(a2i )
and hence σ(S(2i)) > σ(S(2(i−1))) gives valm(a2i ) > valm(a2(i−1)) as required.
In summary we deduce that 〈C, 〈x, y〉, 〈z, w〉〉 is a positive instance of ACS if and only if 〈AC ,RC , σ, P(s), P(t)〉
is a positive instance of 1-PATH, thereby completing the argument that 1-PATH is PSPACE-complete. 
5.3. Translating from evaluation measures to utilities
In this section we show how settings 〈A,R, σ 〉 involving arbitrary evaluation measures, σ , may be translated in a
general way to settings 〈A,R′,U〉 with utility functions so that utilitarian social welfare (σu) in the translated context
mirrors the evaluation measure (σ ) in the original setting.
Consider any 〈A,R, σ 〉 with |A| = n, |R| = m and σ : Πn,m → Q, where it is assumed that for all P ∈ Πn,m ,
σ(P) ≥ −1. The resource translation
τ(A,R) = Rτ
hasRτ = R×A. We define a partial mapping pi : 2Rτ → Πn,m as follows














We note that for any P ∈ Πn,m there is a uniquely defined S ⊆ Rτ for which pi(S) = P: we employ the notation
pi−1(P) to refer to this S.
The concept of resource translation now allows us to prove.
Theorem 14.
a. 1-SWAP is PSPACE-complete.
b. IRO-PATH is PSPACE-complete.
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Proof. In both results we use a reduction from 1-PATH.
For (a), given 〈A,R, σ, P(s), P(t)〉 an instance of 1-PATH, consider the instance of 1-SWAP, 〈B,Rτ ,U, Q(s), Q(t)〉
in which B = {B1, B2}, u2(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ Rτ and
u1(S) =
{−2 if pi(S) = ⊥
σ(pi(S)) if pi(S) 6= ⊥.
Since the instance of 1-SWAP has exactly two agents, any allocation 〈Q1, Q2〉 is completely determined by the subset
ofRτ allocated to B1. Thus, to complete the reduction we set Q(s)1 = pi−1(P(s)) and, similarly, Q(t)1 = pi−1(P(t)).
We claim that 〈A,R, σ, P(s), P(t)〉 is accepted as an instance of 1-PATH if and only if 〈B,Rτ ,U, Q(s), Q(t)〉 is
accepted as an instance of 1-SWAP.
Suppose the former is the case and let
∆ = 〈P(0), P(1) , . . . , P(d)〉
be a witnessing rational 1-bounded path. First notice that, as u2(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ Rτ , so σu(Q) = u1(Q1). It
follows, therefore that
∀1 ≤ k ≤ d u1(pi−1(P(i−1))) < u1(pi−1(P(i))).
That is to say, the sequence of successive allocations, 〈Q(0)1 , . . . , Q(d)1 〉 to B1 given by
〈pi−1(P(0)), pi−1(P(1)), . . . , pi−1(P(d))〉
yields an IR path.
It is also the case, however, that the deal defined from 〈pi−1(P(i−1)), pi−1(P(i))〉 is a 1-SWAP. To see this, recall
that 〈P(i−1), P(i)〉 is 1-bounded. Let {A j , Ak} be the agents involved and r ∈ R be the resource transferred, without
loss of generality, from A j to Ak . Then,
〈r, A j 〉 ∈ pi−1(P(i−1)); 〈r, Ak〉 ∈ Rτ \ pi−1(P(i−1))
〈r, Ak〉 ∈ pi−1(P(i)); 〈r, A j 〉 ∈ Rτ \ pi−1(P(i))
so that the deal corresponding to 〈pi−1(P(i−1)), pi−1(P(i))〉 is realised by exchanging 〈r, A j 〉 ∈ Q(i−1)1 for 〈r, Ak〉 ∈
Q(i−1)2 . We deduce that if 〈A,R, σ, P(s), P(t)〉 is accepted as an instance of 1-PATH then 〈B,Rτ ,U, Q(s), Q(t)〉 is
accepted as an instance of 1-SWAP.
Now suppose that 〈B,Rτ ,U, Q(s), Q(t)〉 is accepted as an instance of 1-SWAP, letting
〈Q(0)1 , Q(1)1 , . . . , Q(d)1 〉
be the sequence of successive allocations to B1 witnessing this. Consider the sequence of allocations,
〈pi(Q(0)1 ), pi(Q(1)1 ) , . . . , pi(Q(d)1 )〉
ofR amongA. It is certainly the case that for each Q(i), pi(Q(i)1 ) 6= ⊥ and σ(pi(Q(i−1)1 )) < σ(pi(Q(i)1 )), so it remains
to show that each of the deals 〈pi(Q(i−1)1 ), pi(Q(i)1 )〉 is 1–bounded. Let 〈r, A j 〉 ∈ Q(i−1)1 and 〈r ′, Ak〉 ∈ Q(i−1)2 be the
resources featuring in the IR 1-SWAP deal 〈Q(i−1), Q(i)〉 so that
Q(i)1 = Q(i−1)1 \ {〈r, A j 〉} ∪ {〈r ′, Ak〉}
Q(i)2 = Q(i−1)2 \ {〈r ′, Ak〉} ∪ {〈r, A j 〉}.
Since pi(Q(i)1 ) 6= ⊥, we must have ∪〈r,A〉∈Q(i)1 r = R, and thus r = r
′. It follows that the deal 〈pi(Q(i−1)), pi(Q(i))〉
corresponds to a single resource, r , being transferred from A j to Ak , i.e. this deal is 1-bounded. In consequence, if
〈B,Rτ ,U, Q(s), Q(t)〉 is accepted as an instance of 1-SWAP then 〈A,R, σ, P(s), P(t)〉 is accepted as an instance of
1-PATH, completing the proof that 1-SWAP is PSPACE-complete.
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For (b), we employ a similar approach: given an instance 〈A,R, σ, P(s), P(t)〉 of 1-PATH we form an instance
〈B,Rτ ,U, Q(s), Q(t)〉 of IRO–PATH in which B = {B1, B2}, u2(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ Rτ and u1(S) is now,
u1(S) =

−2 if |S| < |R|
−2 if |S| = |R| and pi(S) = ⊥
2σ(pi(S)) if |S| = |R| and pi(S) 6= ⊥
−2 if |S| > |R| + 1
−2 if |S| = |R| + 1 and for all 〈r, A j 〉 ∈ S, pi(S \ {r, A j }) = ⊥.
The only unspecified case is that of, |S| = |R| and with pi(S \ {〈r, A j 〉}) 6= ⊥ for some 〈r, A j 〉 ∈ S. In this case,
u1(S) is
2 min〈r,A j 〉∈S : pi(S\{〈r,A j 〉})6=⊥
σ(pi(S \ {r, A j }))+ 1.
To complete the construction we fix Q(s)1 = pi−1(P(s)) and Q(t)1 = pi−1(P(t)). As before suppose that
∆ = 〈P(0), P(1) , . . . , P(d)〉
witnesses to 〈A,R, σ, P(s), P(t)〉 as a positive instance of 1-PATH. The sequence of allocations to B1,
〈Q(0)1 , . . . , Q(d)1 〉 with Q(i)1 = pi−1(P(i)) is IR by the argument used in part (a). Although this sequence is not 1-
bounded we can, however, modify it as follows. From the proof of part (a), we know that the deal 〈Q(i−1)), Q(i)〉
is a 1-SWAP: let 〈r, A j 〉 ∈ Q(i−1)1 and 〈r, Ak〉 ∈ Q(i−1)2 be the resources swapped in order to form Q(i). The deal
〈Q(i−1)), Q(i)〉 may be implemented by,
Q(i−1),01 = Q(i−1)1
Q(i−1),11 = Q(i−1),01 ∪ {〈r, Ak〉}
Q(i−1),21 = Q(i−1),11 \ {〈r, A j 〉}
Q(i)1 = Q(i−1),21 .
This defines a sequence of 1-bounded deals implementing 〈Q(i−1), Q(i)〉. In addition
u1(Q
(i−1),0
1 ) = 2σ(pi(Q(i−1)1 ))
< 2σ(pi(Q(i−1)1 ))+ 1
= u1(Q(i−1),11 )
< 2σ(pi(Q(i)1 ))
= u1(Q(i−1),2) = u1(Q(i)1 ).
Notice that u1(Q
(i−1),1
1 ) = 2σ(pi(Q(i−1)1 )) + 1, follows from the fact that there are exactly two choices of
〈r, A〉 ∈ Q(i−1),11 for which pi(Q(i−1),11 \ {〈r, A〉}) 6= ⊥: one of these is 〈r, Ak〉; the other being 〈r, A j 〉. From the
premise that we have a positive instance of 1–PATH, it follows σ(P(i−1)) < σ(P(i)) so that
σ(P(i−1)) = σ(pi(Q(i−1)1 )) = σ(pi(Q(i−1),1 \ {〈r, Ak〉}))
σ (P(i)) = σ(pi(Q(i)1 )) = σ(pi(Q(i−1),1 \ {〈r, A j 〉})).
Thus, if 〈A,R, σ, P(s), P(t)〉 is a positive instance of 1–PATH then we can construct an IR 1-bounded path in the
instance 〈B,Rτ ,U, Q(s), Q(t)〉 of IRO–PATH.
For the converse, given
〈Q(0), Q(1) , . . . , Q(d)〉
establishing that 〈B,Rτ ,U, Q(s), Q(t)〉 is accepted as an instance of IRO–PATH, it is easy to see that |Q(i)1 | = |R| if
and only if i is even, with |Q(i)1 | = |R| + 1 whenever i is odd. Furthermore, pi(Q(2 j)1 ) 6= ⊥, and
σ(pi(Q(2( j−1))1 )) = u1(Q(2( j−1))1 )/2 < u1(Q(2 j)1 )/2 = σ(pi(Q(2 j)1 )).
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By similar arguments used to those in part (a), from the fact that the deal 〈Q2( j−1), Q(2 j)〉 must be an IR 1-SWAP we
deduce that 〈pi(Q(2( j−1))1 ), pi(Q(2 j)1 )〉 is a σ -rational 1-bounded deal. Hence if 〈B,Rτ ,U, Q(s), Q(t)〉 is accepted as
an instance of IRO–PATH then 〈A,R, σ, P(s), P(t)〉 is a positive instance of 1–PATH, thus establishing that IRO-path
is PSPACE-complete. 
6. Convergence and accessibility
Our analyses of the preceding sections consider one effect of restricting agent negotiation methods. The main
focus being on the complexity of deciding whether a particular reallocation may be achieved. As we noted in the
introduction, such issues can be seen as addressing a rather localised property. In this section our aim is to consider
two different questions, one – Convergence – of a rather more “global” nature, the other – Accessibility – falling in
between the extremes represented by Convergence and the variants of Φ-PATH examined in Section 5. To clarify this
point we now give formal definitions of the problems Φ-Convergence and Φ-Accessibility. In the same style used in
defining Φ-PATH we give a version (for Φ-Accessibility) both in terms of evaluation measures and social welfare via
specific utility functions. For the decision problem Φ-Convergence, however, only the utility form is used, it being
possible to determine complexity bounds for this in a straightforward manner, i.e. without recourse to devices such as
those used in the proof of Theorem 14.
Recall that Φ(P, Q) is a predicate on deals and that a sequence of allocations
∆ = 〈P(0); P(1); . . . ; P(d−1); P(d)〉
is said to be aΦ-path for the deal 〈P(0), P(d)〉 ifΦ(P(i−1), P(i)) holds for each 1 ≤ i ≤ d. We say that∆ is amaximal
Φ-path if
∆ = 〈P(0); P(1); . . . ; P(d−1); P(d)〉 and ∀Q ∈ Πn,m ¬Φ(P(d), Q).
It is, of course, possible to choose Φ(P, Q) in such a way that maximal Φ-paths are not well-defined, e.g. consider
Φ1-bd(P, Q) the predicate which is true if and only if 〈P, Q〉 is 1-bounded. In this case, if Φ1-bd(P, Q) = > then
Φ1-bd(Q, P) = > so that 〈P; Q; P; Q; P; . . .〉 is a (non-terminating) Φ1-bd-path. For the instantiations of Φ(P, Q)
we consider – specifically ΦE1-bd,σ -R and Φ
U
1-bd,IR – infinite length paths cannot occur. More generally, if Φ satisfies
∀P, Q Φ(P, Q)⇒ σ(Q) > σ(P) then there are no infinite Φ-paths.
For a maximal Φ-path ∆ we use last(∆) to denote the final allocation of R that results, i.e. P(d) in the notation
above.
Finally, for P ∈ Πn,m we denote by maxΦ(P) the set
maxΦ(P) = {∆ : ∆ is a maximal Φ-path starting from P}.
For Φ ∈ {ΦU1-bd,IR,ΦE1-bd,σ -R} we note that maxΦ(P) is never empty. If there is no allocation Q for which
Φ(P, Q) holds then maxΦ(P) = {〈P〉}, the path containing exactly one allocation. It is also the case, as shown in [4,
Thm. 3, p. 50], that there are example in which maxΦU1-bd,IR
(P) contains exactly one path ∆ with |∆| = Ω(2m).
Φ-Convergence (denoted by Φ-CONV)
Instance: 〈A,R,U〉.
Question: Is it the case that
∀P ∈ Πn,m ∀∆ ∈ maxΦ(P) ∀Q ∈ Πn,m σu(last(∆)) ≥ σu(Q) ?
Less formally, Φ-CONV asks whether an instance 〈A,R,U〉 has the following property. Given any initial allocation
(P ∈ Πn,m), is it the case that regardless of which Φ-path ∆ is followed, one will always reach an allocation last(∆)
that maximises σu?
Φ-AccessibleE (denoted by Φ-ACCE)
Instance: 〈A,R, σ 〉 and P ∈ Πn,m
Question: Is it the case that
∃ ∆ ∈ maxΦ(P) such that ∀Q ∈ Πn,m σ(last(∆)) ≥ σ(Q) ?
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Φ-AccessibleU (denoted by Φ-ACCU )
Instance: 〈A,R,U〉 and P ∈ Πn,m
Question: Is it the case that
∃ ∆ ∈ maxΦ(P) such that ∀Q ∈ Πn,m σu(last(∆)) ≥ σu(Q) ?
We consider the special cases defined from the predicates ΦE1-bd,σ -R and Φ
U
1-bd,IR introduced at the end of Section 3.
In the specific cases of 1-bounded IR deals, both of these problems are of some practical interest: in settings yielding
positive instances of ΦU1-bd,IR-CONV, it is guaranteed that starting from any allocation and following any sequence of
1-bounded IR deals from this will eventually end with an optimal allocation. Similarly, in the case of positive instances
ofΦU1-bd,IR-ACC
U , it will be known that some sequence of rational 1-bounded deals will lead to an optimal allocation.
Theorem 15. ΦU1-bd,IR-CONV is coNP-complete.
Proof. To show ΦU1-bd,IR-CONV is in coNP, given 〈A,R,U〉 it suffices to test whether the following predicate is true
of all pairs of allocations P , Q in Πn,m :
χ(P, Q) = (σu(P) < σu(Q)) ⇒ (∃ R such that ΦU1-bd,IR(P, R)).
Certainly χ(P, Q) can be evaluated in deterministic polynomial-time since there are exactlym(n−1) 1-bounded deals
consistent with P . To see this algorithm correctly decides instances of ΦU1-bd,IR-CONV, suppose 〈A,R,U〉 should be
accepted: then any allocation P ∈ Πn,m is either optimal (so χ(P, Q) always holds since the premise σu(P) < σu(Q)
is always false) or (if sub-optimal) cannot be last(∆) on any maximal ΦU1-bd,IR-path, i.e. there is at least one IR
1-bounded deal 〈P, R〉 available.
On the other hand, suppose the instance 〈A,R,U〉 should not be accepted. Then there is some maximal ΦU1-bd,IR-
path ∆, whose final allocation, last(∆) is sub-optimal. Since last(∆) is sub-optimal there is an allocation Q with
σu(last(∆)) < σu(Q): as a result χ(last(∆), Q) = ⊥ and such instances would fail to be accepted.
To prove coNP-hardness we use a reduction from UNSAT, an instance of which is a 3-CNF formula
ψ(x1, x2, . . . , xn) =
t∧
i=1
(yi,1 ∨ yi,2 ∨ yi,3)
where
yi, j ∈ {x1, x2, . . . , xn, ¬x1,¬x2, . . . ,¬xn}.
We say that a subset
S ⊆ {x1, x2, . . . , xn, ¬x1,¬x2, . . . ,¬xn}
is useful for ψ if |S| = n, S contains exactly one of each of the literals {xi ,¬xi }, and the instantiation formed by
setting each literal in S to > satisfies ψ .
Given ψ(x1, x2, . . . , xn), the instance 〈Aψ ,Rψ ,Uψ 〉 of ΦU1-bd,IR-CONV has
Aψ = {a1, a2}
Rψ = {x1, x2, . . . , xn, ¬x1,¬x2, . . . ,¬xn}




2n + 1 if S is useful for ψ
2|S| otherwise
u2(S) = |S|.
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We claim that ψ(x1, . . . , xn) is unsatisfiable if and only if 〈Aψ ,Rψ ,Uψ 〉 is accepted as an instance of ΦU1-bd,IR-
CONV.
First observe that the allocation Popt = 〈Rψ ; ∅〉 has σu(Popt ) = 4n, and every other allocation, Q, has
σu(Q) < 4n. Thus to complete the proof, it suffices to show that ψ is unsatisfiable if and only if every maximal
ΦU1-bd,IR-path, ∆ within 〈Aψ ,Rψ ,Uψ 〉 has last(∆) = Popt .
Suppose ψ is unsatisfiable and consider any allocation 〈S,Rψ \ S〉. Since ψ is unsatisfiable, it follows that
u1(S) = 2|S| for every S ⊆ Rψ (since there are no subsets that are useful for ψ). Thus, the only IR 1-bounded
deals possible must involve a transfer of a single literal held by a2 to a1: any transfer from a1 to a2 reduces u1 by
exactly 2 while increasing u2 by exactly one. It follows that any maximal ΦU1-bd,IR-path, ∆, from 〈S,Rψ \ S〉 has
last(∆) = 〈Rψ ,∅〉, i.e. if ψ is unsatisfiable then 〈Aψ ,Rψ ,Uψ 〉 is accepted as an instance of ΦU1-bd,IR-CONV.
On the other hand, suppose that 〈Aψ ,Rψ ,Uψ 〉 is accepted as an instance of ΦU1-bd,IR-CONV. We show that ψ
must be unsatisfiable. Assume the contrary, letting {y1, . . . , yn−1, yn} be a set of n literals whose instantiation to >
satisfies ψ . Now consider the allocation
P = 〈{y1, . . . , yn−1};Rψ \ {y1, . . . , yn−1}〉.
We have σu(P) = 2n−2+n+1 = 3n−1. Consider the 1-bounded deal 〈P, Q〉 under which yn is transferred from a2
to a1. For this, since the set {y1, . . . , yn−1, yn} is usefulwe get σu(Q) = 2n+1+n = 3n+1, so that 〈P, Q〉 is IR. Any
subsequent 1-bounded deal 〈Q, Q′〉, will not, however, be IR: we have seen that this must involve a single resource
transfer from a2 to a1, but then σu(Q′) = 2n + 2 + n − 1 = 3n + 1 with no increase in welfare, contradicting the
premise that 〈Aψ ,Rψ ,Uψ 〉 is accepted as an instance of ΦU1-bd,IR-CONV. We deduce that the assumption that ψ is
satisfiable cannot hold, i.e. if 〈Aψ ,Rψ ,Uψ 〉 is accepted as an instance ofΦU1-bd,IR-CONV. thenψ is unsatisfiable. 
Thus, in contrast to IRO-PATH considered in Theorem 14(b), whose complexity is PSPACE-complete, the (superficially)
more difficult question represented by ΦU1-bd,IR-CONV. is coNP-complete, i.e. under the usual assumptions
significantly easier. This reduced complexity is easily accounted for by the properties of the predicate χ(P, Q) used
in the proof. We note that χ(P, Q) is polynomial-time decidable by virtue of there being only a “small” (polynomially
many) number of cases to consider, i.e. 1-bounded deals compatible with the allocation P . If, however, we considerΦ-
CONV when Φ(P, Q) is such that there may be superpolynomially many Φ-deals compatible with any given P , then
although we cannot guarantee coNP as an upper bound, provided that Φ(P, Q) itself is polynomial-time decidable,
Φ-CONV is (“at worst”) inΠ p2 , i.e. still somewhat easier than Φ-PATH. To see this, it suffices to note that the following
predicate, χ ′(P, Q) is decidable by an NP algorithm:
χ ′(P, Q) ≡ (σu(P) < σu(Q)) ⇒ ∃ R ∈ Πn,m : Φ(P, R) ∧ (σu(R) > σu(P)).
Turning to the problem, Φ-ACCU , notice that we have the following progression
Problem Number of allocations in Instance Complexity
ΦU1-bd,IR-PATH 2 PSPACE-complete
ΦU1-bd,IR-ACC
U 1 See below
ΦU1-bd,IR-CONV 0 coNP-complete
Thus, in principle, we could hope that the classification of ΦU1-bd,IR − ACCU is “closer” to that of ΦU1-bd,IR-CONV In
practice, as demonstrated in the following results, such hopes turn out to be ill-founded.
Theorem 16. ΦE1-bd,σ -R-ACC
E is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. For membership in PSPACE, given 〈〈A,R, σ 〉, P〉 we may use an NPSPACE algorithm, similar to that of
Theorem 11, to choose last(∆), for some ∆ ∈ maxΦ(P). We may then test, in PSPACE, whether σ(last(∆)) ≥ σ(Q)
for every Q ∈ Πn,m accepting if and only if this is the case. Noting that NPSPACE = PSPACE completes the argument.
To establish ΦE1-bd,σ -R-ACC
E is PSPACE-hard, we show that ACS ≤p ΦE1-bd,σ -R-ACCE. Given an instance
〈C, 〈x, y〉, 〈z, w〉〉 of ACS we form an instance 〈〈AC ,RC , σ ′〉, P(C)〉 of ΦE1-bd,σ -R-ACCE. This instance is identical
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to that described in the proof of Theorem 13 except for the following details: P(C) = P(s) the source allocation in the
construction of Theorem 13; σ ′ is defined via
σ ′(Q) =
{−2 if σ(Q) > σ(P(t)) or σ(Q) = σ(P(t)) and Q 6= P(t).
σ(Q) otherwise.
This modification ensures that the allocation, P(t), in the proof of Theorem 13 is the unique allocation which
maximises σ ′. We now have, by exactly the same argument, that an optimal allocation is accessible from P(C) if
and only if 〈C, 〈x, y〉, 〈z, w〉〉 is a positive instance of ACS. 
Corollary 17. ΦU1-bd,IR − ACCU is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. Immediate by applying the translation of Theorem 14(b) to instances of ΦE1-bd,σ -R-ACC
E. 
7. Conclusions
The negotiation questions analysed in Theorem 14, consider environments in which agents may independently
assess their resource holdings and attempt to obtain a “better” resource set by agreeing reallocations with other agents.
In the most basic case, where only two agents are involved, extremely simple protocols15 are sufficiently expressive
to agree a partition of the resource set. Such schemes, even when limited to one resource at a time deals, are capable
of achieving optimal (in the sense of maximising social welfare) allocations, provided that neither agent insists that
given deals be IR. As we observed in the discussion opening Section 3, it is in the extreme case where rationality
constraints are introduced, that significant problems arise with simple negotiation regimes. Some reallocations may
be unrealisable, as demonstrated by [13]. Even if a particular reallocation can be realised by a sequence of 1-bounded
rational deals, the number of deals involved may be exponentially larger than the number of 1-bounded deals required
without the rationality condition imposed. Finally, deciding if such a sequence exists at all, a problem already known
to be NP-hard from [6], is, in fact, (under the standard assumptions) unlikely even to belong to NP: Theorem 14 (b)
proving this decision problem to be PSPACE-complete. Although we do not develop the proofs in detail here, it is
straightforward to demonstrate that this level of complexity is not a property limited to negotiations attempting to
improve social welfare. For example, when the notion of 〈P, Q〉 being “rational” is that of “cooperative rationality”,
then deciding if 〈P(s), P(t)〉 is realisable by a sequence of 1-bounded, cooperatively rational deals is also PSPACE-
complete.16
To conclude we raise some open questions relating to the computational complexity of the decision problems
addressed when alternative formalisms are used for representing utility functions. We have noted that the SLP
representation is general enough to describe any set of utility functions and can do so via a program of length
comparable to the run-time of an optimal algorithm to compute the function’s value. A number of alternative
representation approaches have been proposed. While these are not being completely general they are of interest
as compact representations. In particular, [7,2] introduced the class of k-additive functions as such a mechanism
(Table 1).
A function f : 2R → Q is said to k-additive if there are constants
{αT : T ⊆ R, |T | ≤ k}
for which
∀S ⊆ R f (S) =
∑
T⊆R : |T |≤k
αT · IT (S)
where IT (S) is the indicator function whose value is 1 if T ⊆ S and 0 otherwise.
When k = O(1), i.e. a constant, k-additive functions may be represented by the O(mk) values defining the
characterising set of constants {αT }. It is, of course, the case that for any constant value of k, there will be functions
15 For example, allowing an agent to make offers to buy/sell a single resource for a given price; to accept offers; and to decline these.
16 This is a trivial consequence of the fact that u2(S) = 0 in the reduction presented in Theorem 14 (b).
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Table 1







that cannot be expressed in k-additive form. In the special case of k = 1, it is shown in [2], that ΦU1-bd,IR-CONV is
trivial: every system 〈A,R,U〉 in which each ui is 1-additive, is a priori a positive instance of ΦU1-bd,IR-CONV. For
k ≥ 2, however, the status of other decision problems is less clear. Thus, for k = 2, determining exact bounds for the
accessibility and reachability problems when utility functions are 2-additive is likely to present significant problems.
In particular, we have one unresolved issue which affects whether ΦU1-bd,IR-PATH belongs to NP for this case. Thus,
Dunne [4], introduces the following measures related to Φ-paths.
• Lopt (P, Q): the length of the shortest Φ-path realising 〈P, Q〉.
• Lmax(A,R,U): the maximum value of Lopt (P, Q) over those deals for which a Φ-path exists.
• ρmax(n,m): The maximum value (taken over all choices of utility function) of Lmax(A,R,U).
• ρmaxC (n,m): As ρmax, but with the maximisation taken over utility functions belonging to some class C .
In the case of ΦU1-bd,IR(P, Q), the function ρ
max(2,m) is shown to be exponential in m, a result which provides
indications – justified by Theorem 14(b) – that ΦU1-bd,IR-PATH 6∈NP. It is open, however, as to whether ρmax2-add(2,m) is
superpolynomial in m. A proof to the contrary, i.e that ρmax2-add(2,m) = O(m p) with p = O(1) would in the light of
Theorem 14(b) have some consequences of interest: both the accessibility and reachability problems for such utility
functions would belong to NP. This contrasts with the PSPACE-hardness lower bounds for the general case that have
been the basis of the main results of this paper.
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Appendix. σ -rational, 1-bounded deals in the proof of Theorem 13
For completeness we present in this appendix the case analysis concerning one aspect of the proof of Theorem 13.
This arises in the argument that
〈AC ,RC , σ, P(s), P(t)〉 ∈ L1-PATH ⇒ 〈C, 〈x, y〉, 〈z, w〉〉 ∈ LACS.
In particular, given P ∈ Π5,4(n+m)+1 satisfying at least one of the conditions (C1) through (C6) listed above, we
precisely characterise those allocations, Q, for which 〈P, Q〉 is σ -rational and 1-bounded.
We first note that P satisfies exactly one of the following:
a. C1(P) ∧ ¬C2(P) d. C4(P) ∧ ¬C5(P)
b. C2(P) e. C5(P)
c. C3(P) f. C6(P).
(1)
As a second point, although AC has five agents and thus there are 20 possible choices for the combination of agent
from whom a resource is transferred and to whom this resource is reallocated, in practice the 8 choices arising from〈A2, A3〉, 〈A3, A2〉,〈A1, A5〉, 〈A2, A5〉, 〈A3, A5〉〈A5, A1〉, 〈A5, A2〉, 〈A5, A3〉
 , (2)
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Table 2
1-bounded, rational successors of P
Line P satisfies From To Q satisfies Conditions
1 C1(P) ∧ ¬C2(P) A2 A4 C1(Q) ∧ ¬C2(Q) Q4 ⊂ DIFFV (QV1 ,C(β(QW1 )))
2 C1(P) ∧ ¬C2(P) A2 A4 C2(Q) Q4 = DIFFV (QV1 ,C(β(QW1 )))
3 C2(P) A1 A2 C2(Q) |PV1 | > n + m − |P4|
4 C2(P) A5 A4 C3(Q) |PV1 | = n + m − |P4|
5 C3(P) A4 A1 C3(Q) |PV1 | < n + m
6 C3(P) A4 A5 C4(Q) |PV1 | = n + m
7 C4(P) ∧ ¬C5(P) A3 A4 C4(Q) ∧ ¬C5(Q) Q4 ⊂ DIFFW (QW1 , β(QV1 ))
8 C4(P) ∧ ¬C5(P) A3 A4 C5(Q) Q4 = DIFFW (QW1 , β(QV1 ))
9 C5(P) A1 A3 C5(Q) |PW1 | > n + m − |P4|
10 C5(P) A5 A4 C6(Q) |PW1 | = n + m − |P4|
11 C6(P) A4 A1 C6(Q) |PW1 | < n + m
12 C6(P) A4 A5 C1(Q) |PW1 | = n + m
need not be considered. If P satisfies the conditions described in (1) then a 1-bounded deal transferring a resource
from Ai to A j with 〈Ai , A j 〉 defined by (2), results in an allocation that fails at least one of the conditions (B1)–(B6)
presented in the proof17 of Theorem 13.
Given P satisfying (1), Table 2 characterises possible choices for Q such that 〈P, Q〉 is σ -rational and 1-bounded.
We wish to show that if the instance of 1-PATH constructed from 〈C, 〈x, y〉, 〈z, w〉〉 is accepted then every 1-
bounded, σ -rational path witnessing this must progress (from P = P(s)) according to the sequence specified in
Table 2, where we note that P(s) satisfies C1(P(s)) ∧ ¬C2(P(s)).
For ease of reference we recall the conditions (B1)–(B6) and (C1)–(C6) which must be satisfied in order for P to
have σ(P) ≥ 0
B1. Q1 ⊆ RV ∪RW .
B2. Q2 ⊆ RV .
B3. Q3 ⊆ RW .
B4. QV4 = ∅ or QW4 = ∅.
B5. Q5 ⊆ {µ}, i.e. either Q5 = ∅ or Q5 = {µ}.
B6. For X ∈ {V,W }, if QXi 6= ∅ then for all j , {x j ,¬x j } 6⊆ QXi .
C1. β(QV1 ) = β(QW1 ) and Q4 ⊆ DIFFV (QV1 ,C(β(QW1 ))).
C2. β(QV1 ⊗ QV4 ) = C(β(QW1 )) and Q4 = DIFFV (QV1 ,C(β(QW1 ))).
C3. β(QV1 ∪ QV4 ) = C(β(QW1 )) and µ ∈ Q4.
C4. β(QV1 ) = C(β(QW1 )) and Q4 ⊆ DIFFW (QW1 , β(QV1 )).
C5. β(QV1 ) = β(QW1 ⊗ QW4 ) and Q4 = DIFFW (QW1 , β(QV1 )).
C6. β(QV1 ) = β(QW1 ∪ QW4 ) and µ ∈ Q4.
Similarly, we recall that σ(Q) is given as,
C1 2 Kmnvalm(β(QW1 )) +|Q4|
C2 2 Kmnvalm(β(QW1 )) +|Q4| +n + m − |QV1 |
C3 Kmnvalm(β(QW1 ))+ Kmnvalm(C(β(QW1 ))) −|Q4|
C4 2 Kmnvalm(β(QV1 )) +|Q4| − 2 −3|DIFFW (QW1 , β(QV1 ))|
C5 2 Kmnvalm(β(QV1 )) −2|Q4| − 2 +n + m − |QW1 |
C6 2 Kmnvalm(β(QV1 )) −|Q4|
with all other allocations having σ(Q) = −1.
17 We recall that σ(Q) ≥ 0 only if Q satisfies these six conditions.
140 P.E. Dunne, Y. Chevaleyre / Theoretical Computer Science 396 (2008) 113–144
We proceed by a case analysis of the different possibilities, where we use from(P) to denote the agent from which
a resource is transferred, to(Q) for the agent receiving this resource in the 1-bounded deal 〈P, Q〉, and rP ∈ RC to
denote the featured resource. We note that it suffices to present the analysis with respect to lines (1)–(6) of Table 2:
lines (7) through (12) follow through a near identical argument.
Let 〈P, Q〉 be 1-bounded. Given the cases identified already in (2) we have the following.
Case 1: C1(P) ∧ ¬C2(P)
1(a) from(P) = A1; to(Q) = A2
If rP ∈ RW then Q fails to satisfy (B2), so we may assume rP = v ∈ PV1 . Since C1(P) ∧ ¬C2(P) holds, such
a transfer will result in β(QV1 ) being ill-defined, a situation which is only allowed in (C2) and (C3): C3(Q) is
ruled out since µ 6∈ Q4; C2(Q) requires β(QV1 ⊗Q4) to be well-defined and equal to C(β(QW1 )), but where this
is the case then ¬v ∈ Q4 = P4 and hence P4 = DIFFV (PV1 ,C(β(PW1 ))), contradicting the assumption ¬C2(P).
1(b) from(P) = A2; to(Q) = A1
In this case Q fails to satisfy (B6) with respect to the subset QV1 .
1(c) from(P) = A1; to(Q) = A3
If rP ∈ PV1 then Q fails (B3). If rP ∈ PW1 then β(QW1 ) is ill-defined, a state only allowed with C6(Q) or C5(Q).
The first cannot hold since µ 6∈ P4. The second is impossible also: Q4 = P4 and therefore QW4 = ∅ ensuring
that QW1 ⊗ QW4 is ill-defined.
1(d) from(P) = A3; to(Q) = A1
For this case, Q fails to satisfy (B6) with respect to the subset QW1 .
1(e) from(P) = A1; to(Q) = A4
If rP ∈ PV1 then β(QV1 ) will be ill-defined and since µ 6∈ Q4 by virtue of the fact that C1(P) ∧ ¬C2(P), the
only possible condition that Q could satisfy is (C2), i.e. Q4 = DIFFV (QV1 ,C(β(QW1 ))) and β(QV1 ⊗ Q4) =
C(β(QW1 )). Let v = rP . If ¬v ∈ Q4 then Q fails to meet condition (B6). It now follows, from C2(Q) that
QV1 ⊗ Q4 = PV1 ⊗ P4, i.e. P4 = DIFFV (PV1 ,C(β(PW1 ))) contradicting the assumption ¬C2(P).
If rP ∈ PW1 then from the fact that C1(P) ∧ ¬C2(P), β(QW1 ) will be ill-defined, and since µ 6∈ P4 the only
possibility is that C5(Q) holds, and thus Q4 = {rP } = DIFFW (QW1 , β(QV1 ): notice that P4 must be empty (as
is implied by Q4 = {rP }), for otherwise Q would breach condition (B4) on account of QV4 6= ∅ and QW4 6= ∅.
Comparing σ(P) with σ(Q) in this case, however, it is easily seen that 〈P, Q〉 cannot be σ -rational. Noting that
PV1 = QV1 and β(PV1 ) = β(PW1 ) we have,
σ(P) = 2Kmnvalm(β(PV1 ))
σ (Q) = 2Kmnvalm(β(PV1 ))− 2|Q4| − 2+ (n + m − |QW1 |)= 2Kmnvalm(β(PV1 ))− 3.
1(f) from(P) = A4; to(Q) = A1
In this case noting that P4 ⊂ DIFFV (PV1 ,C(β(PW1 ))), via Lemma 1(a) and C1(P) the resulting allocation would
fail to satisfy (B6) with respect to the set QV1 .
1(g) from(P) = A2; to(Q) = A4
Discussed at the end of Case 1.
1(h) from(P) = A4; to(Q) = A2
Given C1(P) ∧ ¬C2(P), C1(Q) can hold, however, 〈P, Q〉 cannot be σ -rational:
σ(P) = 2Kmnvalm(β(PV1 ))+ |P4|
σ(Q) = 2Kmnvalm(β(PV1 ))+ |Q4|= 2Kmnvalm(β(PV1 ))+ |P4| − 1.
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1(i) from(P) = A3; to(Q) = A4
If P4 6= ∅ then from C1(P), Q will fail condition (B4). Again, from C1(P) both β(PV1 ) and β(PW1 ) are well
defined and, thus, the only option open for Q is that C4(Q). In this case, however, 〈P, Q〉 cannot be σ -rational:
σ(P) = 2Kmnvalm(β(PV1 ))
σ (Q) ≤ 2Kmnvalm(β(PV1 ))+ |Q4| − 2≤ 2Kmnvalm(β(PV1 ))− 1.
1(j) from(P) = A4; to(Q) = A3
In this case, Q fails to satisfy (B3).
1(k) from(P) = A4; to(Q) = A5
From the fact that µ 6∈ P4, Q would breach (B5).
1(l) from(P) = A5; to(Q) = A4
The only options allowing µ ∈ Q4 are C3(Q) and C6(Q). In the first of these it must be the case that QV4 = ∅
for otherwise β(QV1 ∪ QV4 ) is ill-defined. In this case, however, since Q1 = P1, we get from C1(P) that
β(PV1 ) = β(PW1 ) = C(β(PW1 )). It now follows that 〈P, Q〉 is not σ -rational
σ(P) = 2Kmnvalm(β(PW1 ))
σ (Q) = Kmnvalm(β(PW1 ))+ Kmnvalm(C(β(PW1 )))− |Q4|= 2Kmnvalm(β(PW1 ))− 1.
We are left only with Case 1(g) – from(P) = A2 and to(Q) = A4 – corresponding to the first two lines of Table 2 – and
in order to preserve σ(Q) ≥ 0 the only choice available for rP is to as a member of the set DIFFV (PV1 ,C(β(PW1 )))\P4.
Notice that, from¬C2(P) this set is non-empty. We now have two possibilities for Q: C1(Q)∧¬C2(Q), arising when
rP ∪ P4 = Q4 ⊂ DIFFV (PV1 ,C(β(PW1 ))) = DIFFV (QV1 ,C(β(QW1 )))
and
rP ∪ P4 = Q4 = DIFFV (PV1 ,C(β(PW1 ))) = DIFFV (QV1 ,C(β(QW1 ))).
The first is line (1) of Table 2; the second corresponds to line (2).
Case 2: C2(P)
2(a) from(P) = A1; to(Q) = A2
This is discussed at the end of Case 2.
2(b) from(P) = A2; to(Q) = A1
Although Q could satisfy (C2), the resulting deal would not be σ -rational: |QV1 | > |PV1 and |Q4| = |P4|.
2(c) from(P) = A1; to(Q) = A3
If rP ∈ PV1 then Q fails condition (B3). If rP ∈ PW1 , then β(QW1 ) is ill-defined. In this case, however, C6(Q)
cannot hold (since µ 6∈ P4), and C5(Q) cannot hold: from C2(P), we have QW4 = ∅ and thus QW1 ⊗ QW4 is
ill-defined also.
2(d) from(P) = A3; to(Q) = A1
From C2(P) is follows that β(PW1 ) is well-defined, but this would fail to be the case for Q
W
1 which would have
size n + m + 1.
2(e) from(P) = A1; to(Q) = A4
From C2(P) we have P4 = DIFFV (PV1 ,C(β(PW1 ))), thus to retain B6(Q) (with respect to Q4) and B4(Q),
would require
rP ∈ β−1V (β(PW1 )) ∩ β−1V (C(β(PW1 ))).
The resulting allocation, however, satisfies neither (C5) (µ 6∈ Q4) nor (C2) as Q4 6= DIFFV (QV1 ,C(β(QW1 ))): Q
must satisfy one of these as β(QV1 ), is ill-defined.
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2(f) from(P) = A4; to(Q) = A1
Similarly to 2(b), although Q could satisfy (C2), the resulting deal would not be σ -rational: |QV1 | > |PV1 and|Q4| < |P4|.
2(g) from(P) = A2; to(Q) = A4
From C2(P), P4 = DIFFV (PV1 ,C(β(PW1 ))): since Q4 6= DIFFV (QV1 ,C(β(QW1 ))), Q cannot satisfy any of (C1)
through (C6).
2(h) from(P) = A4; to(Q) = A2
The resulting allocation could satisfy C1(Q) ∧ ¬C2(Q) (if |PV1 | = n + m), however, 〈P, Q〉 would not be
σ -rational: σ(Q) = σ(P)− 1.
2(i) from(P) = A3; to(Q) = A4
If P4 6= ∅ then Q fails to satisfy (B4). Otherwise, from C2(P) we have DIFFV (PV1 ,C(β(PW1 ))) = ∅, i.e.
β(PV1 ) = C(β(PW1 )) = β(PW1 ).
In this case, however, PV1 = QV1 , PW1 = QW1 and both β(PV1 ) and β(PW1 ) are well-defined and from
β(PV1 ) = C(β(PW1 )) = β(PW1 )
it follows that DIFFW (QW1 , β(Q
V
1 )) = ∅ so that C4(Q) cannot hold.
2(j) from(P) = A4; to(Q) = A3
If P4 6= ∅ then C2(P) would lead to Q failing to satisfy (B3). If P4 = ∅ then no transfer from A4 to A3 is
possible.
2(k) from(P) = A4; to(Q) = A5 Since µ 6∈ P4 as a consequence of C2(P), any such transfer would result in Q
failing to satisfy (B5).
2(l) from(P) = A5; to(Q) = A4
Dealt with below.
With the exception of Cases 2(a) and 2(l) each of the possible 1-bounded deals from P results in an allocation Q such
that the deal 〈P, Q〉 fails to be σ -rational. For 2(a) – in which from(P) = A1 and to(Q) = A2 – we need only note
that rP ∈ PV1 (in order that (B2) is satisfied) and, for the conditions governing (C2) to continue to be true of Q, it
must be the case that
rP ∈ PV1 \ β−1V (C(β(PW1 ))).
Such a choice of rP is possible if and only if C2(P) with |PV1 | > n+m−|P41 |, i.e. exactly the preconditions relevant
for line (3) of Table 2. Case 2(l), with from(P) = A5 and to(Q) = A4, has only rP = µ as an option. The resulting
allocation, Q, given that C2(P) holds, will satisfy C3(Q) if and only if β(QV1 ∪ QV4 ) is well-defined and equal to
C(β(QW1 )): this is possible only in the conditions prescribed by line (4) or Table 2.
Case 3: C3(P)
We first recall the additional condition imposed in order that C3(P) holds. For
f = β(PW1 )
g = C(β(PW1 ))
valm(g) > valm( f ). This is useful for dealing with Case 3(k).
3(a) from(P) = A1; to(Q) = A2
As with previous cases, we must have rP ∈ PV1 or B2(Q) fails. From C3(P), however, we still have
µ ∈ Q4 leaving only the option C3(Q): this, however, cannot hold since β(PV1 ∪ PV4 ) is well-defined but
β(QV1 ∪ QV4 ) = β(PV1 \ {rP } ∪ PV4 ) is not.
3(b) from(P) = A2; to(Q) = A1 In the same way as the previous case, fromµ ∈ Q4, β(QV1 ∪QV4 )will be ill-defined.
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3(c) from(P) = A1; to(Q) = A3 We may assume rP ∈ PW1 (otherwise (B3) fails to hold). As a result we have
µ ∈ Q4 and β(QW1 ) ill-defined. From C3(P), QW4 = ∅, and so the resulting allocation is unable to satisfy (C6)
the only option open.
3(d) from(P) = A3; to(Q) = A1 Again from C3(P), the instantiation β(PW1 ) is well-defined: this will not be the
case, however, for β(PW1 ∪ {rP }), i.e. β(QW1 ).
3(e) from(P) = A1; to(Q) = A4
Although C3(Q) will hold, provided that rP ∈ PV1 , the deal 〈P, Q〉 will not be σ -rational: |P4| < |Q4| thus
σ(P) = σ(Q)+ 1 using the evaluation condition for (C3).
3(f) from(P) = A4; to(Q) = A1
Considered at the end of Case 3.
3(g) from(P) = A2; to(Q) = A4 Such a transfer will result in β(QV1 ∪ QV4 ) being ill-defined.
3(h) from(P) = A4; to(Q) = A2 Similarly, such a transfer results in β(QV1 ∪ QV4 ) being ill-defined.
3(i) from(P) = A3; to(Q) = A4
From C3(P) it holds that µ ∈ Q4: if Q4 6= {µ} then (B6) fails to hold with respect to Q4; on the other hand,
if QV4 = ∅, then β(QW1 ∪ QW4 ) is ill-defined thereby preventing the option C6(Q) from the fact that β(PW1 ) is
well-defined.
3(j) from(P) = A4; to(Q) = A3
Any choice of rP ∈ P4 results in Q3 not satisfying (B3).
3(k) from(P) = A4; to(Q) = A5
Considered below.
3(l) from(P) = A5; to(Q) = A4
Given C3(P) we have P5 = ∅ and thus no such transfer is possible.
The remaining two cases are 3(f) (from(P) = A4, to(Q) = A1) and 3(k) (from(P) = A4; to(Q) = A5). In the first
of these, given that rP 6= µ (condition (B1) must hold for Q), we have the case described by line (5) of Table 2. In
the second, from (B5) the only choice is rP = µ. If it is the case that Q4 6= ∅, then the resulting allocation, Q, would
satisfy (C2): now recalling that C3(P) enforces,
valm(C(β(P
W
1 ))) > valm(β(P
W
1 ))
were it the case that Q4 6= ∅ and C2(Q) the deal 〈P, Q〉 would not be σ -rational,
σ(Q) ≤ 2Kmnvalm(β(QW1 ))+ |Q4| + n + m= 2Kmnvalm(β(PW1 ))+ |P4| − 1+ n + m
< Kmnvalm(β(PW1 ))+ Kmnvalm(C(β(PW1 )))− |P4|= σ(P).
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